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Notwithstanding the well-known decline in antitrust enforcement over the past few
years, merger enforcement at the antitrust agencies has remained extremely active
The near-perfect litigation record that has been amassed by the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Antitrust Division against mergers that they recently challenged un-
derscores the need for antitrust lawyers to accurately assess the antitrust consequences
of proposed acquisitions. Industrial efficiencies-cost reductions resulting from pro-
duction synergies of the merging parties-have assumed near-paramount importance
in this analysis. Despite their significance, however, the case law, the legal and eco-
nomics literature, and the policy pronouncements of the antitrust agencies have pro-
vided confusing and contradictory guidance as to their role and their use in merger
analysis.
This Article focuses on the very important role that industrial efficiencies have
taken in merger analysis. Mr. Berg traces the development of the "efficiencies doc-
trine" in the policy pronouncements of the Federal Trade Commission and the Anti-
trust Division; he analyzes the treatment of efficiencies in the legal and economics
literature; and he examines the role that efficiencies considerations played in an im-
portant recent case at the Federal Trade Commission, American Medical Interna-
tional. The Article concludes by considering the role that the efficiencies doctrine will
take in merger analysis in the future.
INTRODUCTION
MVJERGER ANALYSIS IS in the midst of an historic revolution.
Courts and antitrust enforcement agencies alike are abandoning
quantitative merger analysis, once regarded as the tried-and-true
measure of legality,' in favor of greater reliance on qualitative com-
* Member, Ohio and District of Columbia bars; A.B., Harvard College (1977); J.D.,
Vanderbilt University (1980).
The author would like to thank Commissioner Terry Calvani of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, James Lynch, James J. Rogers, and especially his wife and colleague, Ellen M.
Weiss, for their helpful comments on this Article.
1. In United States v. Von's Grocery Co., the Supreme Court sustained an enforcement
action against the merger of two supermarket chains. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the resulting combined market share of seven and one-half percent of the Los
Angeles market was potentially anticompetitive and gave little consideration to other relevant
non-quantitative factors. See also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
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petitive analysis.2 Various qualitative considerations such as barri-
362-63 (1963) (merger should be presumed illegal when market share information suggests
that the merger will result in a significant increase in industry concentration); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Under these early cases, the Supreme Court made evidence of substantial resulting market
shares virtually irrebuttable proof of illegality. For instance, under the Justice Department's
1968 Merger Guidelines, the Antitrust Division indicated that it would challenge a merger
between two companies, each with market shares as little as four percent, where the market
was highly concentrated (shares of the four largest firms amounting to approximately 75% or
more of the market). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 5 (1968), re-
printed in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510, at 6884 [hereinafter DOJ 1968 GUIDELINES].
See also id. 8, at 6884 (Department will attach primary importance to the market shares of
the merging firms). However, in the Supreme Court's most recent substantive merger deci-
sion, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., the Court indicated that factors other than
concentration data must be considered in assessing the competitive impact of an acquisition.
415 U.S. 486, 495-504 (1974).
The quantitative or structural approach to determining section 7 illegality, with its heavy
reliance on market concentration and the market shares of the merging firms, is based on the
concentration-collusion hypothesis developed by Bain, Stigler, and Mann, which posits that
increases in market concentration will lead to poor market performance because of collusion
or oligopolistic interdependence. See Gellhorn, Government Merger Policy and Practice-
1983, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 419, 419 n.4 (1983) (citing seminal works of Bain, Stigler, and
Mann).
2. For instance, entry conditions have played a dispositive role in several recent merger
cases notwithstanding the high resulting market shares or high market concentration in each.
See United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1984) (where
company had postmerger market share of 48.8% court concluded that ease of entry by poten-
tial competitors may be considered in appraising whether a merger will lessen competion);
United States v. Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (D.N.J. 1985) ("If ease of entry in the
market is such that the producers in the market could not long sustain an unjustified price
increase, then in spite of a high degree of concentration there has not been a substantial
lessening of competition."); Echlin Mfg. Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 22,268, at 23,297
(FTC June 28, 1985) (in discussing its antitrust challenge to Echlin's acquisition of Borg-
Warner's Automotive-Aftermarket Operations, the FTC held that "one of the most impor-
tant considerations in deciding whether a merger is anti-competitive is the existence of barri-
ers to entry."). See also United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1109 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (in determining that the purchase of stock in a motion picture company by a
corporation and an individual already owning controlling stock in another motion picture
company was not anticompetitive, the court held that there were no significant economic
barriers to entry into motion picture production); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp.
78, 92 (D. Colo. 1975) (in holding that an acquisition of two ready-mix concrete firms by
another ready-mix firm was not anticompetitive, the court considered the fact that new entry
had been recently made into the market, and that there was no reason to believe that the
pattern would change).
The Justice Department's 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines identify several qualitative
factors (relating to the ease and profitability of collusion) in addition to entry conditions that
are considered in assessing the legality of a merger: the nature of the product and terms of
sale, the availability of information about specific transactions and buyer market characteris-
tics to firms in the market, the conduct of firms in the market, and market performance. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § Ill(c) (June 14, 1982), reprinted in 2 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 4503, at 6881-13 [hereinafter DOJ 1982 GUIDELINES]; U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.4 (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
4493, at 6879-16 [hereinafter DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES]. See generally Greenfield, Beyond
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ers to entry, market conditions, and (especially) efficiency gains now
take clear precedence over quantitative measures of market power
in assessing the legality of transactions.'
"Efficiency" is the antitrust buzzword of the day.4 Antitrust
Herfindahl: Non-Structural Elements of Merger Analysis, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 229 (1984);
Yoerg, Leddy, Davis & Hill, Non-Market Share Factors in Horizontal Merger Analysis, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 1255 (1986).
3. Quantitative merger analysis has evolved from a two-part measure of market power
in the 1968 Merger Guidelines (examining the acquiring and acquired firms' market shares
based upon concentration within the relevant market, determined by the aggregate market
shares of the four largest firms in the market). DOJ 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 4-6,
at 683-84. This analysis, however, has evolved in the 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines to a
single measure of market power through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which reflects
both market share and share distribution. DOJ 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § III(A), at
6881-11; DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, §§ 3.1, 3.11, at 6879-12.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated by summing the mathematical squares of
the individual market shares of each of the firms within the relevant market. It reflects the
distribution of market shares between firms by giving greater weight to market shares of the
larger firms, thereby reflecting their greater importance in any anticompetitive activity. See
id. § 3.1, at 6879-12. Under both the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines, the Justice Department will
likely challenge an acquisition causing an increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in
excess of 50 points, where the post-acquisition Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is above 1800
points. Id. § 3.1 1(c), at 6879-14. For a thorough description of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, see Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 402 (1983). See also Greenfield, supra note 2, at 229-38 (explaining deriva-
tion and use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in merger analysis).
Although the FTC does not endorse any particular measure of market power, it has indi-
cated that "the Department of Justice's 1982 revisions to the 1968 Guidelines will be given
considerable weight by the Commission and its staff in their evaluation of horizontal merg-
ers." See FTC, STATEMENT CONCERNING HORIZONTAL MERGERS § I (June 14, 1982), re-
printed in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 4516, at 6901 [hereinafter FTC STATEMENT or
HORIZONTAL MERGER STATEMENT]. See also id. § II, at 6901 (suggesting utilization of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in examining market conditions). See generally C.A. HILLS,
ANTITRUST ADVISER 185 (3d ed. 1985).
4. In several recent opinions, the Supreme Court has identified economic efficiency as
one of the principal goals of antitrust law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613, 2617 (1985); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S.
1, 19-20 (1979); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 69 (1977). See
infra note 67.
Several important commentators have identified the preservation of consumers' property
rights, not economic efficiency, as the primary goal of the anti-merger laws. See A. FISHER,
F. JOHNSON & R. LANDE, MERGERS, MARKET POWER, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: WHEN
WILL EFFICIENCIES PREVENT PRICE INCREASES? (FTC Working Paper No. 130, 3-7, Sept.
1985). But former Assistant Attorney General McGrath has asserted that the major goal of
the Antitrust Division is "to reinforce the notion that the sole basis of antitrust enforcement
should be that decisions should be based on economic efficiency notions." 60 Minutes with J.
Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 131, 131




scholars and lawyers cannot avoid encountering it-along with its
close relation, consumer welfare 5-in court decisions in both the
vertical6 and horizontal7 contexts, or in policy decisions by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) and the Antitrust
Division to initiate enforcement actions.' Due to an overabundance
of low-cost, high-quality, foreign-produced merchandise entering
the United States every day,9 production efficiency has become the
principal goal of American industrial policy, even to the detriment
of such traditional goals as full employment, local control of busi-
ness, and economic atomism.10 This sentiment has become so per-
5. FTC Commissioner Terry Calvani equates maximum consumer welfare with eco-
nomic efficiency:
because economic efficiency exists only when resources are allocated so that no fea-
sible reallocation of either inputs or outputs would increase the welfare of at least
one consumer without simultaneously decreasing the welfare of another consumer.
In a competitive economy, economic efficiency and maximum consumer welfare
occur when consumer surplus (the sum of the maximum price each consumer is
willing to pay for purchased goods minus the market price) plus producer surplus
(producer profits) is maximized.
Calvani, Consumer Welfare Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal Times of Wash., Dec. 24-
31, 1984, at 14 n.7. See also Calvani, The Mushrooming Brunswick Defense: Injury to Compe-
tition, Not to Plaintiff, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 340-45 (1981) [hereinafter Calvani, Bruns-
wick Defense].
6. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service, 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (resale price
maintenance). Accord Calvani & Berg, Resale Price Maintenance After Monsanto: A Doctrine
Still At War With Itself, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1163, 1179-87. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES (Jan. 23, 1985), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 50,473, at 56,185.
7. See, eg., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (blanket copyright licensing).
8. Well-known recent examples include the FTC's decision regarding the General Mo-
tors-Toyota joint venture, see General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp., 48 Fed. Reg.
57,314, 57,315 (1983) (statement of FTC Chairman James C. Miller III, Commissioner
George W. Douglas, and Commissioner Terry Calvani), and the Antitrust Division's decision
not to oppose the merger of LTV Corporation and Republic Steel, see LTV-Republic Steel
Merger-Justice Clearance, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,465, at 56,125 (March 20, 1984).
For a discussion of the role of efficiencies in these two cases, see infra notes 32, 78-81 and
accompanying text.
Of course, in most cases where no challenge is made, the reviewing enforcement agency
will not enunciate publicly the reasons underlying the decision not to initiate an enforcement
action, so the potentially dispositive role that efficiencies play in these prosecutorial decisions
cannot be ascertained. Accord Fisher, Johnson & Lande, supra note 4, at 11 n.26 ("Neither
the Antitrust Division nor the [Federal Trade Commission] has ever publicly stated that it
had declined to challenge a particular merger, despite the expectation of higher prices, be-
cause of sufficient anticipated efficiencies.").
9. See generally Proposed Amendments to the Clayton Act: Hearings on S. 2160 and S.
2022 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Amendments] (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce).
10. Id. ("[T]he declared policy of the Congress [is] that the Government should aid,
counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns.").
See Calvani, Brunswick Defense, supra note 5, at 340-45.
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vasive that the Reagan administration has recently borrowed a
suggestion first made some twenty years ago by economist-Joe
Bain" to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act12 to require considera-
tion of efficiency gains in every case. 13
It is one thing for the antitrust lawyer to recognize the signifi-
cance of industrial efficiencies in contemporary merger analysis, and
quite another to understand when such efficiencies will be consid-
ered, what type will be considered, and how they should be formu-
lated and quantified. These issues frequently tip the balance for or
against a government challenge to a proposed transaction, which in
recent years has proven to be the biggest obstacle to consummation
of transactions. 4 These issues are also central to entertaining the
efficiencies defense in private merger litigation. Thus, an under-
standing of the nuances of these issues, both from an intellectual
and from a practical perspective, is crucial for antitrust lawyers to-
day. Unfortunately, the decisions by the courts and the policy pro-
nouncements of the antitrust enforcement agencies fail to provide
significant and consistent guidance on these issues.
The goals of this Article are relatively modest. Its principal fo-
cus is to review the treatment of industrial efficiencies in contempo-
rary merger analysis. First, the policy bases used by the Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission in deciding whether to
11. See J.S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 658 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter J.S.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL]. See also Bain, Discussion, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 64-66 (1950) [hereinafter
Bain, Discussion]; infra note 161 and accompanying text.
12. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides that:
No person engaged in commerce ... shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1983).
13. See The Merger Modernization Act of 1986, S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., - CONG.
REC. - (1986) (introduced by Senator Thurmond on March 7, 1986) and H.R. 4247, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., - CONG. REC. -_ (1986) (introduced by Congressman Fish on February 26,
1986). See infra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
14. The antitrust enforcement agencies have amassed an enviable record of success over
the past few years in those cases where they have decided to challenge a particular transac-
tion. For instance, since 1984, the FTC has prevailed in each of the seven times that it sought
a preliminary injunction in federal court. Of course, this record does not reflect several ac-
quisitions that were dropped after the FTC authorized its staff to seek a preliminary injunc-
tion but before the staff actually got to court, or transactions that were abandoned after
opposition generated within the Commission became known publicly but before the Commis-
sion actually voted on the matter. See 60 Minutes With Terry Calvani, Acting Chairman,
Federal Trade Commission, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 280 (1986).
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challenge a proposed transaction are examined; 5 second, the
courts' acceptance of the "efficiencies defense" in assessing the le-
gality of a challenged transaction is reviewed;16 and third, the treat-
ment of industrial efficiencies in the merger context by the legal and
economics literature is considered. 7 This Article then analyzes the
application of the efficiencies defense in an important recent merger
case, American Medical International, in which the FTC attempted
to harmonize the recent policy pronouncements of the antitrust en-
forcement agencies with the treatment of efficiencies in the legal and
economics literature." The Article concludes by speculating on the
future direction of efficiencies considerations in merger analysis. 19
I. POLICY STATEMENTS REGARDING THE "EFFICIENCIES
DEFENSE"
A. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
The efficiencies defense has attracted considerable attention
from the Antitrust Division over the past twenty years. In that pe-
riod, starting with the promulgation of the first Merger Guidelines
in 1968, the Antitrust Division has come to accept the important
role that efficiencies considerations should play in merger analysis.
The 1968 Merger Guidelines took a fairly strict position oppos-
ing the efficiencies defense, stating that "[u]nless there are excep-
tional circumstances, the Department will not accept as a
justification for an acquisition normally subject to challenge under
its horizontal merger standards the claim that the merger will pro-
duce economies (Le., improvements in efficiency)."20  The 1968
Guidelines clearly focused on size efficiencies, i.e., economies of
scale.21 Similarly, the Justice Department's 1982 Merger Guide-
lines only recognized efficiencies as a mitigating factor in "ex-
traordinary cases":
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow
firms to achieve available efficiencies through mergers without
interferences [sic] from the Department. Except in extraordinary
15. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 57-81 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 82-163 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 164-213 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 214-45 and accompanying text.
20. DOJ 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 10, at 6885. According to the 1968 Guide-
lines, the principal reasons for rejecting the efficiencies defense were the "severe difficulties"
in establishing the existence and magnitude of the claimed efficiencies and the likelihood that
these same efficiencies could be accomplished through internal expansion. Id.
21. Id.
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cases, the Department will not consider a claim of specific effi-
ciencies as a mitigating factor for a merger that would otherwise
be challenged.22
However, it appeared that the Antitrust Division in the 1982
Guidelines was implicitly inviting the assertion of efficiencies in fu-
ture cases by identifying the types of efficiencies that it would con-
sider and the quantum of proof required:
At a minimum, the Department will require clear and convincing
evidence that the merger will produce substantial cost savings re-
sulting from the realization of scale economies, integration ofpro-
duction facilities, or multi-plant operations which are already
enjoyed by one or more firms in the industry and that equivalent
results could not be achieved within a comparable period of time
through internal expansion or through a merger that threatened
less competitive harm. In any event, the Department will con-
sider such efficiencies only in resolving otherwise close cases.
23
Under the Justice Department's recent 1984 Merger Guidelines,
consideration is given to "significant net efficiencies" when they are
established by "clear and convincing evidence.",24  More impor-
tantly, however, the 1984 Guidelines broaden the focus of the in-
quiry well beyond scale economies to include additional efficiencies:
Cognizable efficiencies include, but are not limited to, achiev-
ing economies of scale, better integration of production facilities,
22. DOJ 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § V(A), 4505, at 6881-19 (footnote omitted).
The 1982 Guidelines also cited difficulties in proof and measurement as the basis for limiting
the efficiencies defense. Id.
In March 1984, three months before issuance of the 1984 Guidelines, Assistant Attorney
General McGrath focused on the treatment of efficiencies under the 1982 Guidelines in his
remarks to the National Association of Manufacturers. Addressing the Antitrust Division's
merger enforcement policy, McGrath stated:
Recent analysis of merger policy also indicates that most acquisitions are
procompetitive, or at least not anticompetitive. For example, many mergers permit
firms to realize scale economies in production, distribution, and marketing. Where
there are technological similarities, mergers may allow for the consolidation of op-
erations, longer production runs, and the elimination of duplication that lower fixed
costs and reduce overhead. Mergers may also allow firms to develop complemen-
tary product lines, reduce transaction costs, and lower the costs of transporting and
obtaining needed raw materials....
The 1982 [G]uidelines also address the treatment of efficiencies in merger analy-
sis. Because efficiencies are difficult to prove, let alone quantify, we are cautious
about accepting a claim that specific efficiencies would save a merger which would
not otherwise pass muster. We do not ignore efficiency claims, but we do require a
factual showing that an otherwise problematic merger proposal is likely to generate
substantial cost savings that cannot be achieved otherwise.
Remarks by Assistant Attorney General J. Paul McGrath to the National Association of
Manufacturers (March 8, 1984), reprinted in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,463, at 56,117,
56,118-20. See generally Greenfield, supra note 2, at 248-51.
23. See DOJ 1982 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § V(A) n.53, 4505, at 6881-19 (emphasis
added).
24. DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3.5, at 6879-17.
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plant specialization, lower transportation costs, and similar effi-
ciencies relating to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribu-
tion operations of the merging firms. The Department may also
consider claimed efficiencies resulting from reductions in general
selling, administrative, and overhead expenses, or that otherwise
do not relate to specific manufacturing, servicing, or distribution
operations of the merging firms, although, as a practical matter,
these types of efficiencies may be difficult to demonstrate.2 5
One of the stated purposes of the 1984 Guidelines was to correct
the earlier restrictive application of the efficiencies defense:
The language of the 1982 Guidelines, however, had a restric-
tive, somewhat misleading tone and indicated that the Depart-
ment would explicitly consider efficiency claims only in
'extraordinary cases.' In practice, the Department never ignores
efficiency claims. Rather, as the revisions now make clear, the
Department considers and gives appropriate weight to efficiency
claims in all cases in which they are established by clear and con-
vincing evidence.2 6
Another very significant change made by the 1984 Guidelines is
that, as a technical matter, efficiencies will only be one of many
factors considered by the Justice Department in deciding whether
to challenge a merger rather than being treated as a defense to a
challenged merger.27  However, it is unclear from the language of
25. Id. (emphasis added). However, efficiencies that can be reasonably achieved by some
means other than the acquisition will be rejected. Id.
26. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING MERGER
GUIDELINES (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4490, at 6879, 6879-5
[hereinafter STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES].
One former antitrust enforcement official, Tyler Baker, has questioned whether there is
any significant difference between the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines' treatment of efficiencies.
Mr. Baker contends that although the 1984 Guidelines specifically state that the Antitrust
Division "will consider any efficiency and it will consider it in any case," both the 1982 and
1984 Guidelines send a clear message that such arguments do not make much difference very
often. Baker, The 1984 Justice Department Guidelines, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 333 (1984)
(emphasis in original).
The 1984 Merger Guidelines can be read as saying, 'We will consider it, but it is not
going to be a winner very often.' This interpretation is consistent with the general
statement in the Attorney General's announcement that the changes would not
have affected any merger decisions in the past several years. If, in fact, the point is
that efficiencies will make a difference more often, I question the wisdom of the
change. My concern is not that efficiency is irrelevant in some ultimate sense, but
rather, that the staff-for which I have great respect-will be hard pressed to apply
the standard in a principled or consistent way.
Id. But see Furth, Applying the Merger Guidelines, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 335, 338-39 (1984)
(consideration of merger-related efficiencies in LTV-Republic and canned sweet potato cases).
27. STATEMENT ACCOMPANYING DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 6879-5.
Both the 1968 and 1982 Guidelines either explicitly or implicitly treat efficiencies as a de-
fense. Compare DOJ 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 10, at 6885, and DOJ 1982 GUIDE-
LIN.S, supra note 2, § V(A), 4505, at 6881-19, with DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 2,
§ 3.5, at 6879-5. The impact of this recharacterization by the 1984 Guidelines may be to
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the 1984 Guidelines whether efficiencies should be considered in
any context other than the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by
the Antitrust Division.
B. Federal Trade Commission Statement Concerning
Horizontal Mergers
Although the FTC Statement28 recognizes the efficiency-en-
hancing aspects of mergers, it stops short of adopting efficiencies as
a legally cognizable defense.29 Instead, the FTC will consider
"measurable operating efficiencies, such as production or plant
economies of scale,"3 only in the exercise of its prosecutorial dis-
substantially reduce or altogether eliminate a defendant's burden of proving the existence of
such efficiencies and instead make proof of the absence of efficiencies an element of plaintiff's
affirmative case, a distinction that may be crucial in .the litigation context. Wes Liebeler has
propounded a very similar view:
If this analysis of the impact of merger-created productive efficiencies is pushed a
bit farther, it raises interesting questions about who has the burden of proof on the
productive efficiencies question. If productive efficiency creation is regarded as a
matter of defense, then the burden clearly should be on the defendant.
But there is another view, implicit in the discussion above. The government
clearly has the burden of showing that a merger tends substantially to lessen compe-
tition. But if the effect of a merger on competition is a function of the merger's
effect on productive efficiency, it would be impossible for the government to show
that a merger substantially lessened competition unless it showed what effect that
merger had on productive efficiency. To put the matter another way, from an eco-
nomic standpoint a merger reduces competition only if it reduces the sum of pro-
ducer and consumer surplus, i.e., only if reductions in allocative efficiency outweigh
increases in productive efficiency. Obviously, in order to determine the effect of a
merger on competition under this formulation, the party with the burden of showing
effect on competition must show the merger's effect on productive efficiency. Under
this approach, the government would have the burden of proof as to the effect of the
merger on both forms of efficiency.
Liebeler, Criteria for Horizontal Mergers, in ANTITRUST ADVISER § 3.27 (2d ed. Supp.
1984) (emphasis added). But cf Hospital Corporation of America, No. 9161, slip op. at 109
(FTC Oct. 25, 1985), aff'd, Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986)
(construing efficiencies defense at FTC, finding that respondent did not meet the standards
for asserting an efficiencies defense).
28. FTC STATEMENT, supra note 3.
29. The FTC Statement states:
To minimize measurement difficulties, it has been suggested that an efficiencies
defense could be limited to measurable operating efficiencies, such as production or
plant economies of scale. These efficiencies are also more likely to be of the kind
that may eventually represent an improved state of the art available to all produ-
cers. While such evidence is appropriate for consideration by the [FTC] in the exer-
cise of its prosecutorial discretion at the pre-complaint stage, the Commission
believes that there are too many analytical ambiguities associated with the issue of
efficiencies to treat it as a legally cognizable defense.
Id. at 6901-5 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, Chairman Miller disagreed with the other
members of the Commission on this point, believing that scale-type efficiencies properly
should be considered as part of the FTC's merger analysis, and therefore beyond the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at n.22. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
30. FTC STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 6901-5. The FTC Statement also mentions, in a
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cretion at the precomplaint stage, not as a part of its substantive
merger analysis in enforcement litigation.31 However, even when
employed in only this very limited capacity, the FTC will require
that two additional criteria be satisfied:
To the extent that efficiencies are considered by the Commission
as a policy matter, the party or parties raising this issue must
provide the Commission with substantial evidence that the re-
sulting cost savings couldnot have been obtained without the
merger and clearly outweigh any increase in market power. 32
different context, "management" and "distribution" efficiencies. Id. Former Commissioner
Clanton, who was responsible for the FTC Statement project while he was at the Commis-
sion, appears to believe that it permitted consideration of scale economies only. Clanton,
Recent Merger Developments: Coming of Age Under the Guidelines, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 345,
345, 357 (1984).
31. Thomas Campbell, who was director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition when the
FTC Statement was issued, recently reasserted his belief that efficiencies should not be recog-
nized as an affirmative defense in substantive merger analysis. Proposed Amendments, supra
note 9, at 264-69 (statement of Thomas Campbell). Campbell cites three reasons: (1) efficien-
cies are virtually impossible to measure with the requisite degree of precision, id. at 7-8;
(2) efficiencies, when balanced against welfare loss from market power, do not enhance eco-
nomic welfare for the consumer, id. at 8; and (3) efficiencies, if they are real, must be mea-
sured against not only the immediate increase in market power (which is the direct result of
the merger), but also future increases in market power (as a result of the more-efficient firm
driving the less-efficient firm(s) out of the market) as well, which are almost impossible to
estimate, id. at 9-10.
32. FTC STATEMENT, supra note 3, at 6901-5. The Commission cited respondents' fail-
ure to satisfy these two criteria in rejecting asserted efficiencies justifications in American
Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1219-20 (1981), and Hospital Corp. of Am., No. 9161,
slip op. at 109 (FTC Oct. 25, 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986). See infra notes
190-91 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the use of efficiencies in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the
FTC, see Stoner, Merger Enforcement at the FTC Under the New Merger Guidelines (1985)
(unpublished manuscript); Pidano & Silvia, Analysis of Efficiencies in Horizontal Mergers
and Joint Ventures at the FTC's Bureau of Economics (1984) (unpublished manuscript).
The Commission's decision on the General Motors-Toyota joint venture is a good illustra-
tion of how efficiencies are considered in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. There the
Commission permitted General Motors and Toyota (the world's first and third largest produ-
cers of automobiles, respectively) to manufacture jointly a new subcompact automobile sub-
ject to certain restrictions. The Commission's analysis emphasized what it considered to be
three significant procompetitive benefits that would likely result from this joint venture:
(I) an increased total output of small automobiles available in the United States; (2) an auto-
mobile that would be cheaper to produce than other alternatives available to General Motors:
and (3) an opportunity to observe and learn the more efficient Japanese manufacturing meth-
ods. General Motors Corp. and Toyota Motor Corp., 48 Fed. Reg. 57,314, 57,315 (1983). The
Commission balanced against these benefits two potential anticompetitive effects of the joint
venture: (I) the potential for a reduction in General Motors' incentive to produce its own
small automobile; and (2) the potential for the exchange information not essential to the joint
venture's operation and which is competitively sensitive. Id. at 57,316.
What makes the General Motors-Toyota decision interesting is the Commission's empha-
sis on the potential for acquiring managerial efficiencies in light of the measureability con-
cerns expressed in the Commission's Horizontal Merger Statement. FTC STATEMENT, supra
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C. Proposed Amendments to the Clayton Act
Two separate amendments to the Clayton Act that would spe-
cifically require consideration of efficiency gains in merger analysis
have recently been introduced. Despite similarities, however, these
proposals would require the consideration of different types of effi-
ciencies in different contexts, and would impose different standards
of proof.
Senator Strom Thurmond33 and Congressman Hamilton Fish34
recently introduced the Merger Modernization Act of 1986, (in con-
note 3, at 6901-5. The Commission clearly demonstrated its willingness to accept these effi-
ciencies despite this previously noted concern over the inability to establish positively their
existence, to quantify them accurately, or to balance them in a quantitative fashion against
anticompetitive concerns. See also id. at n.20 ("Where efficiencies flow from factors peculiar
to the merged firms, such as improved quality of management, their contribution to the econ-
omy as a whole is more problematic.").
These issues are, however, not directly relevant to the examination of efficiencies in this
Article. In the General Motors-Toyota decision, the Commission chose not to examine the
joint venture under traditional merger or concentration analysis (although the Commission
did cite the 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement in a footnote), because "the areas of competi-
tion between [General Motors and Toyota] will dwarf the area of cooperation," and coordi-
nation of output and pricing decisions was prohibited; and instead utilized a more lenient
standard, a modified rule of reason analysis. See Memorandum to FTC Commissioners from
Timothy J. Muris (Director, Bureau of Competition) Regarding Proposed General Motors-
Toyota Joint Venture, File No. 821-0159, 11-13 (Dec. 16, 1983). For a discussion of the rule
of reason analysis, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
691 (1978) (construing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)). More-
over, the Commission's decision on the General Motors-Toyota joint venture should be re-
garded as sui generis, because overriding public policy considerations (the need for the U.S.
automobile industry to become more competitive) had largely preempted traditional antitrust
analysis in that case.
The General Motors-Toyota joint venture has been thoroughly discussed in several recent
law review articles (many of which severely criticize the Commission's decision), and further
analysis of it is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Symposium: Perspectives on
the General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1163 (1985) (discussion in-
cludes an economic assessment, competition analysis, efficiencies justification, and a defini-
tional test for joint ventures); Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, The Rule of Reason, and the
General Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239 (1984) (analysis of rules ap-
plied in joint venture analysis); Note, The GM-Toyota Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or
Illegal Combination in the World Automobile Industry?, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 699 (1984) (im-
plications of the General Motors-Toyota joint venture on the automobile industry); Note,
International Joint Ventures in the United States: The GM-Toyota Deal, 22 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1984) (analysis of General Motors-Toyota joint venture and potential
ramifications); Antitrust Law-Proposed Consent Agreement Between General Motors Corpo-
ration and Toyota Motor Corporation, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1984) (brief commentary).
33. On March 7, 1986, Senator Thurmond (R-S.C.) introduced "The Merger Moderni-
zation Act of 1986" on behalf of the Reagan administration. S. 2160, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., -
CONG. REC. - (1986).
34. On February 26, 1986, Congressman Fish (R-N.Y.) introduced "The Merger Mod-
ernization Act of 1986," on behalf of the Reagan administration. H.R. 4247, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., - CONG. Ritc. - (1986).
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junction with the Reagan administration's proposed plenary over-
haul of the antitrust laws,)35 which amends section 7 of the Clayton
Act.3 6 The Act is intended to make efficiencies one of the primary
considerations in statutory merger analysis in both public and pri-
vate cases.3 7 It identifies specific factors to be considered in assess-
ing the probable competitive effect of the acquisition,3 8 including
35. The administration's antitrust package proposes far reaching changes in antitrust
law of which statutory treatment of efficiencies is only a very small part. The legislative
package would: (1) delete the incipiency standard from the Clayton Act and require that, for
a merger to be judged illegal under the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must show a "significant
probability" that the proposed transaction will be anticompetitive; (2) grant a five year ex-
emption from the antitrust laws for mergers and acquisitions in industries that have been
seriously injured by imports; (3) eliminate treble damage awards in cases other than those
involving illegal overcharges or underpayments, provide for an award of attorneys' fees and
costs to prevailing defendants, and provide for a reduction of amounts that antitrust plaintiffs
have received in settlement; (4) authorize courts to dismiss private suits against foreign enti-
ties where the alleged activity has only minimal or unintended effects on American consum-
ers; and (5) permit corporate directors to serve on the boards of competing companies except
in certain de minimis instances. Although the package has generated a mixed reaction, there
has been near unanimity on the need to recognize efficiencies in merger analysis. Compare
Millstein & Kessler, Compromise Struck on Antitrust Remedies Reform, Legal Times of
Wash., May 26, 1986, at 22, with Pearlstein, Busting The Trustbusters, Inc., id., April 1986, at
35.
36. The principal focus of The Merger Modernization Act of 1986 is on the incipiency
standard contained in section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1983). Section 7 prohibits acquisitions that
"may" substantially lessen competition or "tend to create a monopoly" in any product line or
market. See supra note 12. Until the late 1970's, large firms which desired to merge were
often blocked by virtue of size alone. See, eg., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963) (merger resulted in the bank's gaining control of 30% of commercial banking
in Philadelphia); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (merger concen-
trated 7.5% of Los Angeles' retail grocery market). See supra note 1.
The Reagan administration believes that section 7 is now outdated because it was enacted
when economic understanding was less sophisticated and "social concerns," such as the elim-
ination of jobs or harm to competing, but smaller, firms, dominated antitrust policy. The
administration contends that section 7 has in the past either discouraged or altogether barred
procompetitive acquisitions. See Reagan Administration's Package to Congress For Revision
of FederalAntitrust Laws, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at S-6 (Special Supp. Feb. 20,
1986) [hereinafter Administration Analysis].
Pursuant to the administration's proposal, courts will have to find "a significant
probability" that the acquisition will permit the merged firms to engage in anticompetitive
behavior. Id. at S-9. In addition, the measure of illegality is changed from "lessen competi-
tion" or "create a monopoly" to "substantially increase the ability to exercise market power."
Id.
37. "For the first time, judges, business, and lawyers will be able to look to the law and
know that it recognizes the importance of efficiencies." Proposed Amendments, supra note 9,
at 19 (statement of Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce).
38. These factors, which incorporate both the quantitative and qualitative considera-
tions under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, are: (1) the number and size distribution of firms
and the effect of the acquisition thereon; (2) ease or difficulty of entry by foreign or domestic
firms; (3) the ability of smaller firms in the market to increase production in response to an
attempt to exercise market power; (4) the nature of the product and terms of sale; (5) conduct
of firms in the market; (6) efficiencies deriving from the acquisition; and (7) any other evi-
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"efficiencies deriving from the acquisition"; however, efficiencies
will be considered only when the other five factors indicate that the
acquisition would result in a significant risk of market power.39
Although the statutory language does not set forth the type of effi-
ciencies to be considered, the administration's Analysis accompany-
ing the proposal specifies efficiencies derived from "economies of
scale, better integration of production facilities, plant specialization,
lower transportation costs, and similar savings relating to specific
manufacturing, servicing, or distribution operations of the merging
firms,"'4 along with "other efficiencies [that] can be sufficiently
demonstrated to be achievable."41 The proposal, however, appears
to exclude from consideration those efficiencies that could be
achieved by the firms without merging.42 The Analysis further sug-
gests that once a significant anticompetitive effect is established, the
proponent of these efficiencies (presumably, the merging firms) has
the burden of affirmatively establishing their existence;43 but the
Analysis states that "[i]t should not be the burden of firms to estab-
lish an affirmative case for the existence of efficiencies when the
analysis [of the other five factors] does not indicate that the merger
otherwise would result" in anticompetitive effects."
In anticipation of the Reagan administration's legislative efforts
to overhaul the antitrust laws (and perhaps in an attempt to defeat
such efforts), Senator Howard Metzenbaum earlier introduced the
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1986,11 which, among other things,
dence indicating whether the acquisition will or will not substantially increase the ability,
unilaterally or collectively, to exercise market power. DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 2,
§ 3.5, 4493, at 6879-17.
39. Administration Analysis, supra note 36, at S-10.
40. Id. This adopts nearly verbatim the principal types of efficiencies recognized in the
1984 Guidelines. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41. Administration Analysis, supra note 36, at S-10. This presumably includes the other
additional efficiencies set forth in the 1984 Guidelines that the Antitrust Division concluded
'may be difficult to demonstrate." See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
In his Congressional testimony on S. 2160, Secretary Baldrige referred specifically to
economies "in production, in distribution, in research and development, or in anly other level
of corporate activity." Proposed Amendments, supra note 9, at 18 (statement of Malcolm
Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce) (emphasis added). Assistant Attorney General Douglas
H. Ginsburg, testifying on behalf of Attorney General Edwin Meese III, identified "joint
operating efficiencies, economies of scale, economies of scope, and financial economies." Id.
at 26 (statement of Edwin Meese III, Attorney General).
42. "Where it is necessary to consider efficiencies, however, the courts should also con-
sider whether similar efficiencies could be achieved by the firms without merging." Admilis-
tration Analysis, supra note 36, at S-10.
43. Id. Compare with supra note 27 and accompanying text and infra note 206.
44. Administration Analysis, supra note 36, at S-10.
45. On January 27, 1986, Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced the
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attempts to restrict the consideration of efficiencies in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by the antitrust enforcement agencies. Un-
like the Reagan administration proposal, the Metzenbaum proposal
would amend section 7A of the Clayton Act, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act,4 6 which mandates a premerger review and enforcement mecha-
nism by the Commission and the Antitrust Division.47 Metzen-
baum's proposal requires that a firm48 claiming that efficiencies4 9
will be created by an acquisition submit certain information5" dem-
onstrating such efficiencies. This information is to be considered by
the Antitrust Division or the Commission, in some unspecified
manner, in deciding whether to challenge the acquisition.5' The
proposal, however, limits consideration to operational efficiencies.52
Where the enforcement agency decides on the basis of such cost
efficiencies not to initiate an enforcement action, the Metzenbaum
proposal would require the relevant enforcement agency to certify
that the firms have demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that:
(1) costs of operation are likely to be substantially reduced di-
rectly as a result of the proposed acquisition or joint venture,
(2) the cost reduction is likely to lead to reduced prices, and
promote competition, and
(3) there is no reasonable alternative method for achieving such
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1986. S. 2022, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., - CONG. REc. -
(1986), [hereinafter Metzenbaum proposal or Metzenbaum bill]. This legislation makes many
changes, other than its treatment of efficiencies, that are intended to strengthen enforcement
of the antitrust laws.
46. Pub. L. No. 94-435 § 201, 90 Stat. 1390, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a
(1983).
47. The Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger review program is intended to give "the govern-
ment antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect and investigate large
mergers of questionable legality before ... the assets, technology, and management of the
merging firms are hopelessly and irreversibly scrambled together. ... H.R. REP. No.
1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2637.
See generally A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Mergers and Acquisitions, Joint Ventures, and Inter-
locking Directorates, in ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 214-18 (2d ed. 1984).
48. More specifically, the bill applies to "persons" subject to Section 7A(a) of Hart-
Scott-Rodino. Metzenbaum bill, supra note 45, § 5(a).
49. More specifically, the bill specifies "cost reductions." Id., § 5.
50. The Metzenbaum bill would require the FTC and the Antitrust Division to promul-
gate rules, within 180 days after its enactment, specifying the information that must be filed.
Id.
51. According to the proposed statute, "[t]he Federal Trade Commission and the Attor-
ney General shall take into account such information . I..." Id., § 5(a).
52. "Such information shall be limited to specific reductions in the cost of production,
distribution, transportation, or, in exceptional cases, other factors directly related to firm
operations." Id. Like the administration's proposal, the bill excludes cost reductions that
can be achieved by some reasonable alternative method other than the proposed transaction.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
cost reductions other than the proposed acquisition or joint
venture.53
This certification may be offered in evidence in a subsequent public
or private antitrust action for determining whether the transaction
is anticompetitive.54 However, notwithstanding its detailed ap-
proach, the Metzenbaum proposal does not specify the role that effi-
ciencies are to play in private litigation. Contexts not covered
include where the asserted efficiencies are not dispositive in the ex-
ercise of prosecutorial discretion under section 7A,5' where the
transaction is exempt from premerger review, 6 or where the effi-
ciencies claim is rejected by the reviewing agency but the agency
does not prevail in a subsequent enforcement action.
ii. TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES BY THE COURTS
The lower courts have generally read four early Supreme Court
decisions-Brown Shoe v. United States,57 United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank,"8 United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 9
and FTC v. Procter & Gamble 60 -as disfavoring efficiency justifica-
53. H.R. 4247, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. § 5(b)(l)-(3) (1986).
54. "In the event such a certification is made, it may be offered by any party to any
action under the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act alleging that the acqui-
sition or joint venture violates such laws and shall be relevant in determining whether the
acquisition or joint venture may substantially lessen competition." Id.
55. The Metzenbaum bill would require certification of the existence of such efficiencies
only where the reviewing enforcement agency "declines to initiate an action [on a transac-
tion] on the grounds that the [transaction] is likely to promote competition through reducing
costs." Metzenbaum bill, supra note 45, § 5(b). In most cases, the existence of efficiencies is
only one of several qualitative factors suggesting that the transaction should not be chal-
lenged. Arguably, the Metzenbaum bill would apply only where efficiencies are the single
dispositive consideration, an extremely rare situation. The only example available is the Gen-
eral Motors-Toyota joint venture. See supra note 32. See also Clanton, supra note 32, at 1265
("[fln the GM matter, the Commission seems to be giving virtually dispositive weight to the
claimed efficiencies.") See also id. at 1263 (Commission's emphasis on efficiencies factors
"played a major, if not determinative, role in the decision to approve the [GM-Toyota] ven-
ture."). If this reading of the bill is correct, there is a failure to take into consideration the
antitrust enforcement agencies' tendency to ignore efficiencies as the publicly asserted basis
for their decisions to forego an enforcement action. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act contains numerous statutory exemptions to the pre-
merger filing and notification requirements. In addition, many transactions also fall outside
its jurisdictional reach. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1983). See A.B.A. Antitrust Section, supra note 47,
at 214-17 (summarizes exemptions and jurisdictional requirements). The Metzenbaum bill
would not apply in private merger litigation involving such exempt transactions. Metzen-
baum bill, supra note 45, § 5(a).
57. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
58. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
59. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
60. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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tions in merger cases." However, as the FTC correctly concluded
in a recent decision, American Medical International, a careful read-
ing reveals that discussions of the efficiencies justification in those
decisions are dicta only and that reliance upon them by the lower
courts is misplaced.62 For instance, the defendant in Brown Shoe
61. The following decisions have also been interpreted as opposed to the efficiencies
defense: RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980) (anticompetitive effects which are felt due to a merger are not offset by the increased
ability to compete in another market); Int. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518
F.2d 913, 936 (9th Cir. 1975) (courts are not "required to balance the evil of anticompetitive
effect against a concomitant gain in efficiency resulting from economies of scale."); Calnetics
Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 606, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1972), supp. op.
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal 1973), rev'd
and remanded on other grounds, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976) (acquisitions, however beneficial in making an entity a more vigorous competitor, are
not saved from illegality under section 7); Mississippi River Corp. v. FTC, 454 F.2d 1083,
1089 (8th Cir. 1972) ("honest intentions, business purposes and economic benefits are not a
defense to violations of an antimerger law"); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800,
825 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962) (it is plain from the Clayton Act and its
legislative history that concern with the accomplishment of economies through merger was
not a part of congressional thought, and, regardless of these consequences, mergers which
create a monopoly should be prohibited); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American
Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958)
("the acquisition by one corporation of all or part of the stock of another corporation.., is
within the reach of§ 7 of the Clayton Act" as long as the likelihood of a resulting restraint on
commerce is apparent); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir.
1945) (any corporation which stimulates demand and opens new uses for products and in
doing so acts to control the market to the exclusion of others cannot escape the charge of
monopoly); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. FrC, 284 F. 401, 408 (3d Cir. 1922), adhered to, 299 F.
361 (3rd Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923) (although motive of the acquisiton was
to increase production of aluminum and maintain reasonable prices during the time of war,
court looked only at the effect of the acquisiton in creating a monopoly); United Nuclear
Corp. v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 302 F. Supp. 539, 554-55 (E.D. Pa. 1969) ("It is simply not
legally possible to permit a clear violation of the Clayton Act in one line of commerce in
order to strengthen competition in another line of commerce."); United States v. Mfr. Hano-
ver Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 942-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("It is of no moment that a short-
run by-product may have greater efficiency and lower costs .... the long-run advantage to the
community depends upon the removal of restraints upon competition."); United States v.
Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 414 (1965)
(although economic forces may lead to amalgamation for efficient operations, Congress has
said mergers are undesirable from a social standpoint, and the courts must enforce the law as
Congress wrote it); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (advantages of size must be rejected in favor of a competitive system).
62. 104 F.T.C. 177, 215 (1984). Accord, Hospital Corporation of America, No. 9161
(FTC Oct. 25, 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986). See infra text accompanying notes
183-84. Care must be exercised when determining the type of efficiencies claim being as-
serted. For instance, the most commonly quoted statement on the efficiencies issue in Phila-
delphia National Bank-that an anticompetitive merger "is not saved because, on some
ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits or credits, it may be deemed beneficial"-
refers to balancing competitive effects across different markets. Philadelphia National Bank,
374 U.S. at 371. This is quite different from an efficiencies defense asserted where the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the same market are balanced.
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did not argue economic efficiency as a defense, but instead at-
tempted to establish that no efficiencies would be produced as a re-
sult of the acquisition.63 In Philadelphia National Bank, the
See also United Nuclear Corp., 302 F. Supp. at 555 ("It is simply not legally possible to permit
a clear violation of the Clayton Act in one line of commerce in order to strengthen competi-
tion in another line of commerce."); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887, 898-
99 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See generally C.A. HILLS, supra note 3, § 3.28.
63. In Brown Shoe the Justice Department challenged the merger of two shoe manufac-
turers-retailers, G.R. Kinney and Brown Shoe. The district court concluded that the lower
prices resulting from the acquisition would drive independent retailers out of the market. See
Brown Shoe, 179 F. Supp. at 738. On appeal, the Justice Department argued that the merger
would produce lower costs, lower prices, and better quality goods. Brown Shoe claimed that
no such economic efficiencies would result. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
finding of liability, stating:
A... significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large national chain which
is integrated with a manufacturing operation. The retail outlets of integrated com-
panies, by eliminating wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from
the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices
below those of competing independent retailers. Of course, some of the results of
large integrated or chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independent stores may be ad-
versely affected. It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But we
cannot fail to 'ecognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the pro-
tection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occa-
sional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of de-
centralization. We must give effect to that decision.
Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
630, 631 (1977); Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 381, 407 (1980) (the Court, in Brown Shoe, did not concern itself with the
efficiencies defense since the Brown Shoe Co. did not assert it. Thus the "Court ... was not
presented with, nor did it specifically address, the issue of efficiency as a justification."). Ac-
cord, Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. EcON. REV. 105,
113 (1969) (Brown Shoe has led companies who have considered a merger to "consciously
[suppress] the economics aspect" since it may be used successfully by the government to
challenge the merger); Note, Economies of Scale: Weighing Operating Efficiency When En-
forcing Antitrust Law, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 799 n.162 (1981) [hereinafter Laudati]
(Brown Shoe is representative of those decisions which hold that a section 7 violation can be
established with proof that, due to the merger, the merged firm will be more efficient than its
smaller competitors).
The government asserted a similar economic efficiencies theory in United States v. Tide-
water Marine Service, Inc., where it was alleged that capital costs, research, and development
savings would result from the acquisition. 284 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. La. 1968). The district
court noted:
[W]e do not feel that economies of size alone can be any basis for invoking the
antitrust laws. Quite the contrary, for the business quest for economy and efficiency
is a mainstay of competition. It is when this quest is eliminated and stagnation sets
in that competition suffers. Economies of size, acquired through a merger, will jus-
tify the application of the antitrust laws only when it offers the merged firm signifi-
cant competitive advantages so that a probability of a substantial lessening of
competition ensues. To hold otherwise would espouse a warped view of the funda-
mental policy of antitrust law; mergers should not be condemned because they are
beneficial to the merging parties, but because they are harmful to customers and
competitors, or to competition as a whole. In this case, even if the merger were to
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defendant claimed that the local community would benefit from a
larger bank, a "socio-political" justification for the merger, not an
economic efficiencies defense. Moreover, the Supreme Court in that
case explicitly recognized that it was not entertaining an economies
of scale defense.' The Phillipsburg National Bank case similarly
did not focus on operating efficiencies.65 And in Procter & Gamble,
the defendant did not attempt to demonstrate the anticipated sav-
ings in sales, distribution, and manufacturing that would result
from the acquisition as a factor to be balanced against the anticom-
petitive effects of the acquisition (perhaps because the Court viewed
such scale economies as discouraging new entry). 6 In short, the
afford economies of size to the defendants to the exclusion of other firms, the an-
ticompetitive result is clearly absent.
Id. at 341. See also General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 594-96 (1980).
In Heublein, the Commission cited the decision in F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967) for the proposition that even "significant advertising advantages could violate
Section 7." Id at 595. The author of that opinion, former Commissioner Robert Pitofsky,
recently testified in favor of a statutory efficiencies defense, asserting that "in [Brown Shoe
and Procter & Gamble], efficiencies appear to have been counted against the merger-an in-
terpretation of Section 7 that was unwise and virtually indefensible." Proposed Amendments,
supra note 9, at 286 (statement of Robert Pitofsky).
64. In Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court noted:
There was evidence that Philadelphia, although it ranks fourth or fifth among
the Nation's urban areas in terms of general commercial activity, ranks only ninth
in terms of the size of its largest bank, and that some large business firms which
have their head offices in Philadelphia must seek elsewhere to satisfy their banking
needs because of the inadequate lending limits of Philadelphia's banks ....
[The Bank] offered testimony that the merger would enable certain economies of
scale, specifically, that it would enable the formation of a more elaborate foreign
department than either bank is presently able to maintain. But this attempted justi-
fication, which was not mentioned by the District Court in its opinion and has not
been developed with any fullness before this Court, we consider abandoned.
374 U.S. at 334 n. 10 (emphasis added). Defendants had argued that the resulting bank "with
its greater prestige and increased lending limit, would be better able to compete with large
out-of-state (particularly New York) banks, would attract new business to Philadelphia, and
in general would promote the economic development of the metropolitan area." Id. at 334.
65. 399 U.S. 350 (1970) (without explicitly rejecting efficiencies, the Court emphasized
the product market, the geographic market, the anticompetitive effects and the convenience
and needs of the community).
66. In 1957, Procter & Gamble, a large diversified manufacturer of household products,
acquired the assets of Clorox Chemical Co., the leading manufacturer of household liquid
bleach, and the only one selling it on a national basis. Although the Court condemned econo-
mies as an antitrust defense (citing Brown Shoe), the Court was examining economies as an
anticompetitive, rather than procompetitive, effect. It stated:
The acquisition may also have the tendency of raising the barriers to new entry.
The major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is advertising.
Clorox was limited in this area by its relatively small budget and its inability to
obtain substantial discounts. By contrast, Procter's budget [approximately $80 mil-
lion] was much larger; and, although it would not devote its entire budget to adver-
tising Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term threat of a new
entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts to advantage in advertis-
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decisions that appear to reject the assertion of an efficiencies defense
in section 7 cases do not appear to be well supported.6 7
Taking the contrary position are several lower court decisions
that have directly examined efficiencies in section 7 merger analysis.
In Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
plicitly found scale economies in the manufacture of heavy duty
truck wheels to be a procompetitive factor in favor of the acquisi-
tions.68 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil
Corp. recognized operating and scale efficiencies as important fac-
tors in assessing the acquisition's competitive impact.69
Two more recent cases, FTC v. Bass Brothers Enterprises7° and
ing Clorox. Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant
Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox.
Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 579 (footnote omitted). See generally Greenfield, supra note 2,
at 229, 249-50 (discussing the reluctance of the FTC and the courts to recognize an efficien-
cies defense).
67. Consideration of economic efficiencies in section 7 analysis is consistent with the
increased importance that the Supreme Court has given to economic analysis in recent anti-
trust decisions. For instance, Justice White wrote in Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System:
[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show
effect,... the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our
predominantly free-market economy - that is, whether the practice facially ap-
pears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead one designed to
'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive.'
441 U.S. at 19-20 (1979) (citing and quoting United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13,
441 n.16). See supra note 4. The Supreme Court in Northern Pacific R'y v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958), identified economic efficiency as one of the principal goals of antitrust,
and in United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441 n. 16, characterized economic efficiency as
procompetitive. See also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (under rule-of-reason analysis fact-finder
should "[weigh] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.").
In the section 7 context, the Supreme Court has focused on economic evidence in assess-
ing the legality of acquisitions. See, eg., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486; United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). See generally Kauper,
The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 497, 508 n.26, 526 (1983) (noting the courts' increasing reliance on economic
efficiency).
68. 603 F.2d 345, 360 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court notes that "Fruehauf had a pro-competi-
tive effect on the market through its collaborative efforts to develop new types of heavy duty
wheels by virtue of its ability to draw new entrants into production of conventional wheels by
offering to deliver its patronage."). Cf United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F.
Supp. 543, 566-67 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (recognizing scale economies as relevant, but finding the
proposed merger to be anticompetitive).
69. 669 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir.), aff'g 530 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ohio 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982) (the court allocated a separate part of its opinion to "benefits" arising
from the proposed merger, noting operating efficiencies and advantages of scale).
70. 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,041 (N.D. Ohio 1984). This case also illustrates the reli-
ance that some courts have placed on the FTC and Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
COST EFFICIENCIES
United States v. LTV Corp. ,71 illustrate the current use of efficien-
cies in merger analysis. In Bass Brothers, the Commission sought
preliminary injunctions against two acquisitions in the carbon black
industry: Sid Richardson Carbon's acquisition of Ashland's domes-
tic carbon black operations and Columbian Enterprises' acquisition
of Continental Carbon Company. Both Sid Richardson and Co-
lumbian claimed that efficiencies would result from the acquisitions.
Sid Richardson planned to integrate fully Ashland's operations into
its own, saving an estimated $6.5 million in overhead costs by,
among other things, eliminating separate sales and research opera-
tions. Other savings to be achieved through the merger included
$1.1 million resulting from the installation of energy conservation
equipment and $1.6 million resulting from changes in reactor opera-
tions. Columbian anticipated a $5 million savings in fixed overhead
costs by closing two domestic plants and additional unspecified sav-
ings by eliminating duplication in sales forces, research and devel-
opment staffs, and administrative departments. The trial court
rejected both efficiencies claims, finding no reliable evidence that
firms in the industry incurred significantly different costs of produc-
in assessing the legality of an acquisition under section 7. Other decisions, however, do not
even cite the Guidelines, and instead employ different merger analysis. See, eg., FTC v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Factors to consider
when determining the impact on competition include the market shares of the merging firms,
industry trends towards concentration, the degree of concentration within the industry, prior
mergers by the firms in question and the barriers to entry in the industry .... This list of
factors is not exhaustive.")
Other courts specifically reject mandatory reliance on the Guidelines. See, eg., Monfort
of Colorado, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 579 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 484
(1986) (Court of Appeals rejected the use of the Guidelines, asserting that "these guidelines
are more useful for setting prosecutorial policy than delineating judicial standards.") See,
e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971) (the Guidelines "are in no way bind-
ing on the Department in a particular case and... of course, the Guidelines are in no way
binding on the courts.")
But at least one court has held that the Antitrust Division cannot disavow its merger
Guidelines in a federal court enforcement action. See Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d at
983 ("If the Department of Justice [in its Merger Guidelines] routinely considers ease of
entry as relevant to determining the competitive impact of a merger, it may not argue to a
court addressing the same issue that ease of entry is irrelevant."). Nothing, however, man-
dates the use of the Guidelines in private merger litigation. See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1- MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT 26 (1977)
(indicates that the Guidelines are "merely rules of thumb to guide analysis and to give some
predictability to the likelihood of [an] enforcement action"); Schwartz, The Merger Guide-
lines: Guide to Government Discretion and Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revision of
the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 575, 577 (1983) (purpose of Guidelines is to educate
the public about regulatory process, to control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and to
provide legal guidance for courts).
71. 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,133, at 66,334 (D.D.C. 1984).
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tion or that these firms suffered costs of production or that these
firms suffered cost disadvantages; 72 that none of the companies was
failing and the financial losses that they had recently suffered "were
not unusual;"'7 3 that no serious efforts were made to find buyers
other than industry competitors;74 that the only new technology in
the industry related to production cost savings, and nearly all com-
panies were adopting, or considering, similar cost-reduction tech-
nologies;75 and that these efficiencies were "largely available
through feasible means other than merger." 76 The trial court held
that "[d]efendants' claims of efficiencies yielded by their acquisi-
tions do not amount to public equities outweighing the public inter-
est in effective antitrust enforcement. 7 7
In L TV Corp., the Justice Department consented to the merger
of two competitors in the steel industry, LTV and Republic Steel.
The companies claimed that extensive efficiencies would result from
production integration and consolidation, producing savings esti-
mated at $343 million per year or approximately $27 per ton of
steel.7 ' The Justice Department concluded, among other things,
that existing financial difficulties facing Republic and the possibility
that the merged company might realize some of these efficiencies
suggested that the merger would not threaten competition.79 Re-
72. Bass Brothers, 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,041, at 68,617.
73. Id. at 68,616-19.
74. Id. at 68,617-18.
75. Id. at 68,611-13.
76. Id. at 68,619.
77. Id. at 68,622.
78. LTV Corp., 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,133, at 66,341. See also LTV-Republic Steel
Merger-Justice Clearance, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,465 at 56,126 n.* (1984) (explain-
ing why the merger of LTV Corp. and Republic Steel Corp., initially opposed by the Depart-
ment of Justice, should not be challenged).
79. Id. at 56,125. In approving the consent decree, Assistant Attorney General Mc-
Grath stated:
No one can be certain whether this merger will have a substantially positive
impact on the domestic steel industry. Obviously, the industry needs considerable
cost-cutting, modernization, and restructuring to compete successfully in today's
market. However, it is far from clear that mergers are the answer. It can by no
means be assumed, without a careful case-by-case analysis, that every merger will
produce net efficiencies or that efficiencies cannot be achieved without merger. Re-
cent years have witnessed numerous examples of mergers between troubled compet-
itors entered into for hoped-for efficiencies that never materialized. Indeed, there
are relatively few good examples of success stories in such circumstances. However,
since the LTV-Republic merger, as restructured, does not raise substantial competi-
tive problems and since there is at least a chance that the merger may permit these
companies to compete more effectively, the end result may well be a competitive
plus.
Id. at 56,127 (emphasis added). Compare United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1958
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,189 at 74,681-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (defendants "urge earnestly" that
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viewing the consent decree under the provisions of the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, 80 the trial court concluded that,
notwithstanding the parties' inability to quantify definitively the an-
ticipated cost savings from these operating efficiencies, the merger
was in the public interest:
[A] basic United States industry-steel--continues to find itself
in a weakened and deteriorating condition. The present plight
and future prospects of LTV and Republic are no exception to
this pattern. The purpose of the present merger is to achieve
savings in cost through increased efficiencies which will enable
the surviving company to compete more effectively both here and
in the export market. We cannot predict that these efforts will
succeed, but we can say with some certainty, that without an
opportunity to improve their acute financial predicament, their
future will indeed be bleak.8'
III. TREATMENT OF EFFICIENCIES IN THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMICS LITERATURE
Legal and economics commentators generally favor recognition
of efficiencies in section 7 cases, but disagree over the type of effi-
ciencies that should be considered and how they should be consid-
ered. 2 The discussion below surveys the principal legal and
economics literature with regard to two specific issues: (1) under
the beneficial aspects of the challenged merger be considered). See Greenfield, supra note 2,
at 248 (noting that efficiencies "may have helped save the Republic-LTV merger.")
80. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982) (known as the "Tunney Act").
81. LTV Corp., 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,133, at 66,343 (1984). Several other recent
decisions make at least passing reference to efficiencies in merger analysis. See Christian
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., I Trade Cas. (CCH) V 66,374, at 64,841
(6th Cir. 1985) ("We are obliged to acknowledge that this antitrust injury would not be
sufficient were the injury merely to result from increased efficiency .. " As a result of other
anticompetitive injuries, the court gave Stroh and Schmidt standing to seek declaratory and
injunctive relief.); Stroh Brewing Co. v. Malmgren, I Trade Cas. (CCH) - 64,670, at
73,644 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (In denying Schlitz's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court
"considered the following factors which show that competition may not be lessened by the
proposed merger and may, in fact, be increased: geographical sales patterns, different brands
and grades of beer, excess plant capacity, economies of scale, national advertising and product
differentiation, inability to fix prices, industry structure and history.") (emphasis added)).
Cf. United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 65,656, at 69,363 (2d
Cir. 1983) (court noted that vertical integration may foster efficiency and enhance
competition).
82. The analysis that follows focuses on the legal and economics literature adopting the
efficiencies defense in the section 7 context. For a thorough bibliography of sources that
examine issues relating to efficiencies in the merger context, see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, MERGER LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY 1950-1980 137-42 (1982); A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC-
TION, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 191-95
(1981). For a discussion of efficiencies in contexts other than section 7, raising issues beyond
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what conditions should efficiencies resulting from an acquisition be
considered in assessing the competitive impact of that acquisition
under section 7; and (2) what types of efficiencies should be consid-
ered? Unfortunately, this discussion reveals a mass of contradictory
theories on the application of efficiencies in merger analysis, provid-
ing very little guidance for the antitrust lawyer.
A. Areeda and Turner's Partial Efficiencies Defense
Areeda and Turner conclude that a theoretical case for an effi-
ciencies defense is especially strong in cases where market demand
is declining, stable, or expanding very slowly.83 They believe that
the efficiencies defense should not be available where market de-
mand is growing substantially, except where entry into the market
is easy. 4 They argue that the defense should be limited to cases
where diseconomies of scale cause both of the merging firms to suf-
fer from substantial cost disadvantages of five percent or more. 5
They maintain that to permit an efficiencies defense based on "rela-
tively trivial economies" would encourage its being asserted frivo-
the scope of this Article, see Clanton, supra note 32. See also infra notes 159-163 and accom-
panying text.
Several important commentators have rejected the efficiencies justification. See R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 124-29 (1978) (the problem of accurately measuring projected
cost savings precludes use as a matter of proof, although productive efficiency should be
factored into overall merger evaluation); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1976) (notes the
difficulty of measuring actual costs of proposed merger against monopoly costs to determine
projected efficiencies); Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87
YALE L.J. 1, 83-85 (1977) (economic efficiencies are factored into his own proposed merger
rules but not treated separately); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 318-21 (1960) (notes congressional preference for
"noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated market and the unlikely possibility that mergers
yield striking cost reductions."). See infra note 121.
As Judge Bork has pointed out, the dispute regarding acceptance of an efficiencies defense
reflects the conflict between protection of consumer welfare and protection of small business
as the principal goal of antitrust. R. BORK, supra, at 201-04. An efficiencies defense would
be appropriate if consumer welfare was the sole goal of antitrust; however, if small business is
to be protected, industrial efficiency must sometimes yield to small business concerns, given
that small businesses are often less efficient than their larger competitors. See id; see also
supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
On the basis of an empirical study of three-quarters of all acquisitions over the period
1950 through 1976, economists F.M. Scherer and David Ravenscraft have concluded that
mergers on average are not efficiency-enhancing, although some have resulted in efficiency
gains. See D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, THE PROFITABILITY OF MERGERS (FTC
Working Paper No. 136, 1986). For a summary of these conclusions, see Proposed Amend-
ments, supra note 9, at 81-85 (statement of F.M. Scherer).
83. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 4 ANTITRUST LAW 946e, at 168 (1968) [hereinafter
AREEDA & TURNER].




lously, and "[i]t is doubtful, to say the least, that the efficiency gains
from such an approach would be worth the administrative costs,
given the fact that alleged gains often will not be present.
8 6
With regard to the type of efficiencies to be considered, Areeda
and Turner would limit the efficiencies defense to economies in:
(1) plant size;87 (2) plant specialization (where there is product
complementarity and where diseconomies extend to approximately
70% of the firm's output); and subject to certain qualifications, pos-
sible economies in (3) distribution;88 (4) research and develop-
ment;89 and (5) promotion.90  Areeda and Turner reject an
efficiencies defense based on: (1) plant specialization economies
lacking product complementarity, or where diseconomies affect
only a small portion of output; or economies in (2) capital cost,
(3) procurement, (4) overhead, or (5) the combination of comple-
mentary resources.91 Areeda and Turner would allow aggregation
only of those specific economies permitted above; other claims, such
as procurement and overhead economies, would be excluded.92
Once these economies are firmly established, however, Areeda and
Turner believe that the economies defense should be absolute, re-
86. Id. at 168.
87. Areeda and Turner add that direct and specific proof should be required to establish
the existence of potential size economies. Id. at 172. Size diseconomies should not be based
on proof of losses, abnormally low profits, or declining market shares. Id. at 174.
88. Areeda and Turner propose that distribution diseconomies should be considered
only upon a showing that (1) there are significant scale economies in distribution (e.g., ware-
housing, retailing); (2) there are economies in integration or in "quasi-integration" by con-
tract with distributive outlets; (3) efficient distribution and integration requires use of outlets
handling only one manufacturer's product line; and (4) the merging firms are compelled to
sell widely in local markets where their sales are too small for efficient distribution. Id. at
181.
89. Areeda and Turner contend that proof problems of research and development econ-
omies "are truly formidable." Id. at 189. Although relative efficiency can theoretically be
determined by comparing the value of research and development "output" with the cost of
producing that output, there are numerous practical problems in calculating the value of that
output and its cost. Id. However, Areeda and Turner observe:
The task would not always be hopeless. Some cases will be relatively clear, such
as those in which effective research requires extremely expensive facilities which
small firms plainly cannot afford because purchase would involve too high a per-
centage of the firm's resources in light of the risks, or those in which firms below a
certain size appear to engage in no significant R & D at all.
Id. at 190.
90. Id. at 147-48. Areeda and Turner summarize the prerequisites for a promotional
economies defense: (1) substantial scale economies must exist; (2) due to such scale economies
the merging firms must operate at a substantial competitive disadvantage in the market; and
(3) there must be no effective alternatives to horizontal merger to overcome that disadvan-
tage. Id. at 186.
91. Id. at 175.
92. Id. at 196.
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gardless of the merging firm's aggregate market share.93
B. Williamson's Naive Tradeoff Analysis
Williamson's "naive tradeoff model" concludes that a merger
yielding non-trivial real economies must produce substantial market
power and result in relatively large price increases for the net allo-
cative effects to be negative.94 Rather than develop a set of rules
relating to the circumstances under which the economies defense
should be considered, 95 Williamson sets down rough guidelines for
the application of economies:
96
93. Id. at 197. Areeda and Turner reject the notion that such economies should consti-
tute a defense only when the merging firm's market share does not exceed some specified
figure or, quantitatively, potential cost savings outweigh aggregate market share (i.e., "the
higher the [market] share, the larger the cost saving required to make out the defense"). Id.
94. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter Williamson I]; Williamson, supra note 63; Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977) [hereinafter
Williamson II].
The central inquiry is this: how much must costs decrease to offset a given increase in
market power and ensure that prices do not increase? Williamson's most minimal non-trivial
economy is two percent. Williamson II, supra, at 709. But Thomas Campbell, former direc-
tor of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, refers to calculations suggesting that efficiencies
must cut costs fifty percent, where the elasticity of demand is two, before the price will fall.
Campbell, The New Merger Guidelines: A Federal Trade Commission Perspective, 51 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 295, 301 (1982). Campbell identifies the general types of efficiencies that are
eligible for the defense:
The second point is about the kind of efficiencies: They must represent a general
lowering of the cost curve, and not merely the fact that one manager believes he can
run a business better than another. The reason is that only a general lowering of the
cost curve, an improvement in technology, some device that has a patent (which
eventually will run out), only that sort of improvement will eventually redound to
the benefit of the economy in general. The others would merely be an increased
rent to the corporation involved.
Id. (emphasis in original). The focus, therefore, is on efficiencies that produce a downward
shift in marginal costs, either short-term or long-term.
Williamson concludes, under the naive tradeoff model, that if a reduction in average costs
on the order of five to ten percent is available through merger, the merger must give rise to
price increases in excess of twenty percent (where the elasticity of demand is two) and in
excess of forty percent (where the elasticity of demand is one-half) for the net allocative
effects to be negative. See generally A. FISHER, F. JOHNSON & R. LANDE, supra note 4;
Daskin, Efficiency, Market Shares, and Mergers (1985) (unpublished manuscript).
95. Williamson's partial equilibrium analysis admittedly fails to account for certain pos-
sibly undetected economic effects. Consequently, Williamson posits several qualifications to
his tradeoff rule. These "qualifications," which are actually additional factors that should be
considered in determining the net allocative effect of an acquisition, include inference and
enforcement expense, timing, incipiency, weighting, income distribution, extra-economic
political objectives, technological progress, and the effects of monopoly power on managerial
discretion. Williamson I, supra note 94, at 24. The impact of these qualifications on analysis
under the naive tradeoff model is examined in Williamson's principal literature. See William-
son I, supra note 94, at 24-32; Williamson II, supra note 94, at 710-713.
96. Williamson suggests that his naive tradeoff model would support a change in the
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I do not think it feasible or rewarding for the courts to enter-
tain explicitly an economies defense involving a full-blown trade-
off assessment. The courts may nevertheless find it instructive to
permit arguments pertaining to technological and transactional
economies to be brought before them. For one thing, permitting
such arguments assures that economies will not be regarded per-
versely as anticompetitive. Additionally, an economies defense
may help put the relevant issues in perspective. If the govern-
ment argues that a merger has an anticompetitive purpose or ef-
fect, when, in fact, the evidence of either is extremely thin and
speculative, permitting the defense to demonstrate that nontrivial
economies exist presumably will make the court more reluctant
to accept the government's contentions. On the other hand,
when economies cannot be shown to exist or appear to be negligi-
ble, courts will perceive little social loss in holding for the
government ...
That a quantitative assessment is too ambitious, however,
does not imply that no assessment whatsoever should be at-
tempted. On the contrary, in circumstances in which trial evi-
dence discloses that purported anticompetitive effects are small
or negligible, the introduction and qualitative evaluation of econ-
omies is apt to have merit. Not only is a better understanding of
the economic incentives that underlie the merger likely to result,
but---especially if the economies are at all substantial-the possi-
bility that economies will be regarded inadvertently as anticom-
petitive will be forestalled.
97
In addition to general technological and transaction economies,
Williamson makes specific reference to economies of specializa-
tion,98 as well as plant scale, distribution, integration, technological,
and management economies.9 9 He concludes, however, that "the
cost savings attributable to merger frequently are not of a produc-
tion function kind but instead have transactional origins. ' ' l° °
treatment of efficiencies under the Merger Guidelines (at the time, the 1968 Guidelines) as
follows:
With respect to vertical and horizontal mergers, for example, Merger Guidelines
could be rewritten to acknowledge a band of uncertainty within which an econo-
mies defense would be available: above a specified set of market share values, a
merger would be disallowed; below a second set of values, a merger would be per-
mitted; within the range between, an economies defense, subject to an appropriate
set of threshold stipulations, would be entertained.
Williamson, supra note 63, at 114 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
97. Williamson II, supra note 94, at 728, 731.
98. Id. at 724.
99. See Williamson I, supra note 94, at 18 n.2.
100. See Williamson II, supra note 94, at 723. Williamson states:
It is my contention that mergers for conventional scale-economy reasons are
much less common than mergers for transactional-economy reasons. In situations
in which autonomous market contracting actually or prospectively incurs non-triv-
ial transaction costs, nonmarket or market assisted modes warrant active considera-
tion. Put another way, administrative modes of organization-firms-and
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With regard to issues of proof, Williamson believes that difficul-
ties inherent in the measurement of such economies can be over-
come. "These [difficulties] can be mitigated at the outset by
requiring that claims of economies pass threshold specifications
before such will even be entertained." 10 1 He describes these proof
thresholds as follows:
Operationally it may be essential to express the value of the
threshold as a function of the ease with which economies can be
established. Economies that have a highly speculative aspect
should be required to reach a higher minimum level than those
which are more objectively specified. (Thus if economies in both
production and distribution expenses are claimed, and if the for-
mer are better specified than the latter, distribution economies
would have to reach a higher threshold than would production
economies to be admissible.) Since the ease with which exagger-
ated claims are detected varies directly with the degree of distor-
tion attempted, and since evidence of distortion seriously
debilitates a defense, adjusting the threshold in this way will tend
to protect ... against grievously inflated efficiency claims.102
Williamson concludes that the defendant should bear the burden of
establishing the existence of such economies by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.' 0 3
C. Muris' Presumptive Model
Muris employs the Williamson tradeoff analysis to conclude
that a merger should be presumed to be procompetitive where the
evidence demonstrates the existence of nontrivial economies. 104
Under this rule, there is no need to compare the benefits of the
merger with the cost of increased market power.1 0 5 Where savings
autonomous contracting modes of organization-markets-are alternative ways of
executing transactions. Unfortunately, this proposition, which is both familiar and
acceptable as an abstract matter, has had only a limited impact on economic analyis
of the firm and even less of an impact on antitrust enforcement. This is especially
true with respect to merger policy. Mergers, I submit, should be regarded positively
when internal organization yields transactional economies that bring about a de-
sired contractual result, provided that the resulting combination does not give rise,
directly or indirectly, to market power effects that outweigh the transactional
benefits.
Id. at 723-24 (footnote and emphasis omitted).
101. Williamson, supra note 63, at 113 (footnote omitted).
102. Williamson I, supra note 94, at 24.
103. Id. See also Williamson II, supra note 94, at 703.
104. Muris, supra note 63, at 393, 417, 422. Muris defines "nontrivial" economies to be
in the magnitude of only one to two percent. Id. at 420. See supra note 94.
105. Muris, supra note 63, at 420.
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cannot be measured °6 (as in the case of nontechnical efficiencies) or
cannot be measured reliably (as in the case of some technical effi-
ciencies), Muris concludes:
Discussing efficiency within litigation will still be relevant if a
defendant shows that the merger will probably result in non-
trivial economies, even when it cannot show their precise magni-
tude. To explore this point, it will be helpful to divide the proof
of efficiency into two components: existence and magnitude.
Merely showing the existence of the efficiency may constitute suf-
ficient justification. If the defendant shows that the merger will
increase efficiency and if the cost savings can be projected over a
substantial part of the production process, the merger may then
be justified, particularly where proof of possible market power is
weak. Moreover, this approach is perfectly consistent with the
Clayton Act, which is concerned with probabilities, not
certainties. 10 7
Where this presumption is rebutted, Muris believes that courts
should require more extensive proof of the resulting efficiencies or
engage in a rough balancing of the claimed economies against the
increased market power.'0 s
With regard to the type of efficiencies to be considered, Muris
concludes that the defense should encompass only real (as distin-
guished from pecuniary)'0 9 cost savings, which encompasses both
technical and nontechnical efficiencies. Technical efficiencies,
which are usually easier to demonstrate than nontechnical efficien-
cies, ' 0 include economies of scale; nontechnical efficiencies include
transaction costs, capital costs, and management costs."' He con-
cedes that entertaining claimed economies at trial will complicate
section 7 cases:
None of this is meant to deny the fact that the efficiency de-
fense will complicate trials. Some efficiencies will not be suffi-
ciently demonstrable, and some proceedings will devolve into a
mass of conflicting, confusing testimony ....
[But i]f merger law is to be based upon sound economic the-
ory, efficiency must be explicitly considered. Although an effi-
ciency justification will somewhat complicate merger
106. Muris cites the use of engineering and statistical studies as two acceptable methods
of measuring the magnitude of cost savings resulting from efficiencies. Id.
107. Id. at 422-23 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 426.
109. "Pecuniary economies, such as cost savings from tax advantages, merely transfer
wealth without reducing the resources spent to produce the product in question." Id. at 417
n.155 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 419.
!11. Id. at 418-419.
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proceedings and economies cannot always be demonstrated, the
justification will increase the number of beneficial mergers that
withstand judicial scrutiny. Further, antitrust jurisprudence and
its relation to economics would seem to require efficiency
evidence. 112
D. Fisher and Lande's Implicit Incorporation Model
Fisher and Lande reject adoption of the Williamson tradeoff
analysis on a case-by-case basis and instead propose implicitly in-
corporating efficiencies "[b]y raising the market-share thresholds of
presumptive illegality to account for potential efficiency gains.""' 3
They believe that the empirical evidence on efficiencies resulting
from mergers is conflicting and difficult to interpret. 1 4 Conceeding
that existing studies tend to show that acquired firms benefit sub-
stantially from mergers, they nevertheless conclude that "[a]ny net
gains from corporate acquisition can reflect so many different fac-
tors that it is a leap of faith to attribute these gains to increased
efficiencies.""' 5 Fisher and Lande contend that the Williamson na-
ive tradeoff model, "as a first approximation," accurately depicts
the net welfare effect of such mergers. 1 6 However, they maintain
112. Id. at 424, 431 (footnote omitted). Muris suggests that the availability of post-acqui-
sition evidence of cost savings will reduce difficulties of proof. Id. at 425 n. 185. See infra
note 219 and accompanying text.
113. Fisher & Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 1582, 1669 (1983). The same authors recently reexamined, inter alia, the tradeoff anal-
ysis between cost savings resulting from efficiencies and the increase in market power. See A.
FISHER, F. JOHNSON & R. LANDE, supra note 4.
114. Fisher and Lande examine a wide range of empirical data: cost data based on survi-
vor analysis, statistical techniques and engineering studies; firm profitability studies; and di-
rect evidence of economic efficiencies from actual mergers such as comparisons of accounting
data for merging firms with data for a control group of nonmerging companies, econometric
studies evaluating changes in stock market valuation due to a merger, and case studies of
individual mergers. Fisher & Lande, supra note 113, at 1606-24. Based on these studies,
Fisher and Lande conclude:
[T]here appears to be substantial support for the inductive generalizations that
many individual mergers create substantial efficiencies, that many others are nota-
ble failures, and that the record of prediction has been very poor in individual cases.
The record certainly is too poor to give us any confidence that we can predict the
level of cost saving on a case-by-case basis sufficiently accurately to make this pre-
diction a major basis of public policy.
Id. at 1624 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 1693.
116. Fisher and Lande credit Williamson with near universal acceptance of what has
become known as Williamsonian merger analysis: merger efficiencies are desirable and
should to some extent offset potential market-power effects. Id. at 1583. They contend that
Williamson's work has caused the policy debate to shift from questioning the existence and
desirability of efficiencies to the consideration of the best way to factor anticipated efficiencies
into merger enforcement. Id. at 1584. See also id. at 1650.
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that a complete analysis must go beyond consideration of marginal
cost, demand elasticity, and market power to include other factors,
such as wealth transfers, possible changes in product quality, the
timing and dispersion of the market power and efficiency effects,
political impact, technological progress, and the costs of rent-seek-
ing behavior by firms with market power." 7 But Fisher and Lande
recognize that this creates severe theoretical difficulties on an indi-
vidual case basis." 18 "[T]he net effect of these various qualifications
is that small differences in the elasticity of demand, specifications of
the demand relationship, expected rise in price-cost margins, or an-
ticipated costs savings from expected efficiencies can change the
tradeoff dramatically in individual cases.'
Furthermore, Fisher and Lande conclude that practical
problems associated with tradeoff analysis can be equally severe.
Efficiencies cannot be conclusively established by "clear and con-
vincing evidence" since many of the most significant efficiencies are
incapable of prediction or measurement prior to the merger. Proof
of efficiencies requires numerous cost calculations and quality com-
parisons that would in all likelihood be prohibitively complicated,
lengthy, expensive, and controversial. 2 ° Fisher and Lande con-
clude that because efficiencies considerations defy explicit proof,12
117. Fisher and Lande admit that most of these additional factors are points that Wil-
liamson himself originally included as qualifications to his naive tradeoff model. See id. at
1630-44.
118. See id. at 1650-51 (discussing in detail the theoretical difficulties with quantifying
the welfare tradeoff analysis).
119. Id. at 1644.
120. Id. at 1653-54. Fisher and Lande believe that the "clear and convincing" standard
of proof mandated by the 1982 and 1984 DOJ Guidelines will have an extremely limiting
effect on the outcome of merger litigation or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion because
"one rarely could call premerger predictions of efficiencies 'clear and convincing' evidence."
Id. at 1654 (footnote omitted).
121. This difficulty of proof was instrumental in Bork's rejection of the efficiencies
defense:
Passably accurate measurement of the actual situation [including an estimate of
efficiencies and deadweight loss] is not even a theoretical possibility; much less is
there any hope of arriving at a correct estimate of the hypothetical situation. Con-
sider two of the factors that would have to be known: the demand curve over all
possible relevant ranges of output and the marginal cost curve over those same
ranges. Only by knowing where marginal cost and demand intersect could one
know whether there was a restriction of output and what its size was. Nobody
knows these curves. Even the companies involved do not ....
There is a good reason why firms do not know these things, and it is the same
reason why they cannot be known through an antitrust trial. The demand curve is
not known because it changes continually and because the company is not con-
stantly plotting it by running its prices up and down. The attempt to do so might
make a minor contribution to science, but quite a research grant would be required,
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the party with the burden of proof would most likely not prevail. 22
Fisher and Lande also believe that use of a tradeoff analysis on
an individual case-by-case approach would greatly increase business
uncertainty, thereby increasing the firms' costs of finding desirable
mergers and, in some cases, even deterring firms from attempting
potentially desirable mergers123 Furthermore, adoption of tradeoff
analysis on a case-by-case basis fails to recognize the limited ability
of the courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies to assess effi-
ciencies accurately,1 24 thus risking "judicial ad hocery, and erosion
of confidence in the judicial system, and increased costs of business
uncertainty and antitrust enforcement."1 25  They estimate that a
case-by-case efficiencies defense would increase uncertainty, en-
forcement, and litigation costs by thirty to one hundred percent,
1 26
but would fail to reduce those costs associated with barring desira-
ble mergers or from allowing undesirable mergers. 127 Conse-
quently, Fisher and Lande reject not only the full efficiencies
defense1 2 ' advocated by Muris, but also the Areeda and Turner par-
tial efficiencies defense.1 29  They maintain that implicit incorpora-
since the losses incurred in an attempt by a major company might make serious
inroads on the resources of even the Ford Foundation.
Id. at 1657-58 (quoting R. BORK, supra note 82, at 125-26) (emphasis added by Fisher &
Lande).
122. Id. at 1655-56.
123. Id. at 1655.
124. Fisher and Lande believe that tradeoff analysis "[m]ay be beyond the limits of relia-
ble adjudication." Id. at 1657. They believe that courts are best suited to adjudicate
problems of an "either-or" variety, i.e., which side is correct, whereas an efficiencies defense
requires an interrelated and multivariate inquiry, balancing market power, efficiencies and
quality changes. They conclude:
Given the nature of the multivariate problem, lawyers usually cannot meaningfully
isolate one factor from another. Nor can judges rely on traditional step-by-step
reasoning. Judges therefore are unlikely to render opinions that will guide future
business and legal decisions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 1656.
126. Id. at 1676. Fisher and Lande conclude that this would easily amount to an increase
in litigation costs of $100 million or more per year. Id.
127. Id. at 1695.
128. "A complete efficiencies defense would allow the litigation of a merger's anticipated
efficiencies in the enforcement proceeding. However, such a defense probably should be con-
fined to consideration of productive efficiency gains, as opposed to redistributive profits or
mere tax savings." Id. at 1660 n.261 (citing P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 83, at 956-
59).
129. A partial efficiencies defense would be limited to a consideration of the most signifi-
cant or concrete factors. Id. at 1660. Fisher and Lande conclude that "the partial efficiencies
defense would still suffer from the inherent difficulties of a case-by-case approach. Id. at
1663. These difficulties include unpredictability, the balancing of market power, efficiencies,
and quality changes, and litigation complexity and expense. Fisher and Lande fear that
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tion of efficiencies has several advantages over an individual case-
by-case tradeoff analysis.' 30
An implicit approach to the incorporation of efficiencies
would provide a simple alternative to the complexity and the
measurement problems of a case-by-case evaluation. By raising
the market-share thresholds of presumptive illegality to account
for potential efficiencies gains, this approach would permit the
realization of some, but not all, of the efficiencies likely to result
from mergers. Although it would surely miss many important
potential efficiency gains, it would have the advantages of simpli-
fying litigation and increasing certainty and predictability. There
are two aspects to an implicit approach. First, it would set the
Merger Guidelines at a level that would permit mergers likely to
yield efficiencies but not likely to lessen competition substan-
tially. Second, it would balance market-power and efficiency ef-
fects implicitly. Under this approach, the Merger Guidelines
should be more permissive than they would be if they considered
only market-power effects.131
Although Fisher and Lande fail to set forth any specific numeri-
cal thresholds of presumptive legality, they conclude that the DOJ
1982 Guidelines:
are consistent with our recommendation to raise the Guidelines'
thresholds for challenging mergers, largely for efficiency reasons.
The numerical levels are reasonable and close to standards in re-
cent court decisions, and they fairly balance the competing con-
gressional concerns with wealth transfers, efficiency, and
incipiency. The [1982] Guidelines, however, are less clear on
whether the enforcement agencies actually will consider efficien-
cies in individual cases. The evidentiary requirements in both
statements are so restrictive that if the agencies follow them as
written, the Government will continue to drop merger investiga-
tions for efficiency reasons only in very rare instances. Depar-
tures from the strict written standards, however, especially with
a change in the composition of the Federal Trade Commission,
courts might not be able to limit such an efficiencies defense to the "most provable" types of
evidence, given the necessarily fine (and, under appellate review, perhaps arbitrary) distinc-
tion that the trial court must make between relatively provable and relatively speculative
efficiencies. They also argue that "a partial efficiencies defense might not even immunize a
significant number of efficiency-producing mergers." Id. at 1663.
130. Given Fisher and Lande's rejection of tradeoff analysis on an individual case basis,
there is little need to focus on the type of efficiencies that would be eligible for consideration
in a specific transaction. However, they do identify specific efficiencies underlying their gen-
eral analysis, including operating efficiencies (such as economies of scale, resource allocation,
technological complementarities, specialization in product line, reduction in transportation
costs, and various transaction-cost economies); management efficiencies (resulting from infu-
sion of superior management, and coordination of research and development synergies or
distribution facilities); and organizational efficiencies. Id. at 1599-1604.
131. Id. at 1669 (footnotes omitted).
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could lead to a full efficiencies defense being forced on the Com-
mission, the Justice Department, and the courts, with the result-
ing social costs of vastly greater business uncertainty, litigation,
and enforcement expenses, and no reason to expect any net com-
pensating gains.'
32
E. Liebeler's Full Tradeoff Analysis
Liebeler urges adoption of the Williamson welfare tradeoff anal-
ysis on a case-by-case basis. 33 Liebeler's approach, however, re-
quires netting reductions in allocative efficiency (i.e., creation of
market power) from productive and marketing efficiencies resulting
from the transaction:
13 4
The fact that horizontal mergers may 'increase economic effi-
ciency and render markets more rather than less competitive,'
Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS . . . is a factor that should be
counted in favor of those mergers that appear to have that effect.
From an economic standpoint, permitting the creation of pro-
ductive and marketing efficiencies is at least as important as
(most probably much more important than) preventing firms
from increasing their ability to restrict output and, thereby, to
reduce allocative efficiency.
From an economic standpoint, horizontal merger policy
should be concerned with these two different forms of economic
132. Id. at 1695-96. It is unclear whether Fisher and Lande are advocating a considera-
tion of efficiencies beyond the presumptive legality thresholds already established in the DOJ
1982 Guidelines and, if so, what form that "extra" consideration would take. Any considera-
tion beyond a strictly mathematical application of these presumptive legality thresholds
would be subject to the same criticisms made by Fisher and Lande against the case-by-case
tradeoff analysis.
133. Liebeler, supra note 27; Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive Superiority in Con-
centrated Industries, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1260-63 (1978) [hereinafter Liebeler, Market
Power].
134. Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes acquisitions which substantially lessen com-
petition. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1983). See supra note 12. Liebeler argues that from an economic
standpoint competition cannot be lessened by a merger unless it operates to reduce the sum of
producer and consumer surplus below the level that would have existed absent the merger.
Liebeler, supra note 27, at 336. Accord, R. BORK, supra note 82, at 61. Determining the
impact of a particular acquisition on the sum of producer and consumer surplus requires a
consideration of both allocative and productive efficiency.
"Competition" is not something separate and apart from productive efficiency, to be
traded off against it or not. The Justice Department cannot, in short, tell what the
effect of a merger on competition will be unless it takes into account the productive
efficiencies that might be created by that merger.
[The Supreme Court's opinion in Broadcast Music Inc.] makes it clear that an
increase in efficiency makes a market more rather than less competitive, that the
effect of a transaction on efficiency is one way in which the effect of that transaction
on competition is to be determined. This is quite different from the approach taken
by the [DOJ 1982] Guidelines in which the effect of a transaction on competition is
seen as an issue completely separate from its effect on efficiency.
Liebeler, supra note 27, at 336.
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efficiency. Both of these forms of efficiency are different facets of
the competition that [section] 7 of the Clayton Act was designed
to preserve. A horizontal merger should be illegal if its only ef-
fect is to increase the ability of firms to restrict output (reduce
allocative efficiency). It should be legal if its only effect is to in-
crease productive efficiency. The legality of a merger producing
both effects should turn on its net effect. 135
Liebeler recognizes the inherent difficulty in employing tradeoff
analysis in specific cases, 136 but maintains that assessing the exist-
ence and magnitude of productive efficiencies is no more difficult
than measuring the effects of the merger on allocative efficiency.1
37
135. Id. at 333-34 (citing Broadcast Music Inc., 441 U.S. at 20) (emphasis added).
Liebeler strongly criticizes the 1982 Guidelines for failing to recognize that increases in effi-
ciency have a positive effect on competition. Id. at 333. He claims that a slightly modified
version of the Williamson benefit-cost analysis is the correct theoretical structure for making
such a tradeoff analysis. Id. at 334. See also Liebeler, Market Power, supra note 133, at 1260.
"The [DOJ 1982] Guidelines make no attempt at such a trade-off. Their casual treatment of
the efficiency issue is a serious if not fatal defect in their approach to assessing the legality of
horizontal mergers." Liebeler, supra note 27, at 334.
136. Liebeler asserts that this measurement problem is the principal reason why the Jus-
tice Department failed to give efficiency creation a more prominent role in evaluating hori-
zontal mergers under the 1982 Guidelines, "not because it is opposed to the creation of
efficiencies." Liebeler, supra note 27, at 334. He believes that this proof issue even undercuts
the role that the Justice Department ascribes to efficiencies in the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion:
It is not surprising that the Justice Department does not emphasize the efficiencies
issue more than it does; the possibility of efficiency creation in horizontal merger
cases makes it more difficult for the Department to win cases. In addition, there is
no support whatever for the assertion made in the Guidelines that "[i]n the over-
whelming majority of cases, the Guidelines will allow firms to achieve available
efficiencies through mergers without interference from the Department." [1982]
Guidelines at § V(A). The Department is not willing to consider efficiencies in spe-
cific cases because it is difficult to 'prove' either their existence or their magnitude.
If that is so, we are entitled to ask how the authors of the Guidelines know that
'available efficiencies' can be achieved within the limits established by the
Guidelines.
Id. at 335.
137. Liebeler criticizes the Justice Department for sidestepping the difficulties inherent in
measuring the effect on market power by presuming competitively adverse effects when mar-
ket concentration levels reach certain numerical levels. Id. at 334. He believes that concen-
tration is not a good proxy for the measurement of market power:
Even though the Justice Department continues to rely so heavily on concentra-
tion, there is no reason for the courts to do so. More importantly, there is no reason
for lawyers faced with the problem of defending a merger that exceeds the concen-
tration levels approved by the [1982] Guidelines to acquiesce either in those levels
or in the idea that concentration is a good measure of the level of competition in an
industry or of the effect of a merger. The argument against reliance on concentra-
tion figures should be pushed by those lawyers, no matter what position the [1982]
Guidelines may take.
Id. at 335. See supra note 1 (discussing concentration-collusion hypothesis).
One former Antitrust Division official, Donald F. Turner, has concluded that some effi-
ciencies, such as production scale economies, are more readily determinable than other non-
efficiencies factors, such as ease of entry or product homogeneity. Turner, Observations on
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He believes that requiring strict proof of the existence and magni-
tude of productive efficiencies while, at the same time, presuming
the existence of adverse allocative efficiency effects on the basis of
concentration levels is grossly inconsistent. "From the standpoint
of consumer welfare, it is impossible to distinguish these two types
of efficiency. If we are to have an antitrust policy based on demon-
strable economic effect, it seems clear that they should be treated in
similar ways." 1 38
Liebeler attempts to solve this proof issue by shifting the burden
of proof on the efficiencies issue from the defendant, as an affirma-
tive defense, to the plaintiff, as a part of its required showing of a
substantial lessening of competition. He observes that:
The [plaintiff] clearly has the burden of showing that a merger
tends substantially to lessen competition. But if the effect of a
merger on competition is a function of the merger's effect on pro-
ductive efficiency, it would be impossible for the [plaintiff] to
show that a merger substantially lessened competition unless it
showed what effect that merger had on productive efficiency. To
put the matter another way, from an economic standpoint a
merger reduces competition only if it reduces the sum of pro-
ducer and consumer surplus, i.e., only if reductions in allocative
efficiency outweigh increases in productive efficiency. Obviously,
in order to determine the effect of a merger on competition under
this formulation, the party with the burden of showing effect on
competition must show the merger's effect on productive efficiency.
Under this approach, the [plaintiff] would have the burden of
proof as to the effect of the merger on both forms of efficiency.' 39
A recent Note by Laudati also supports the use of a Williamson-
like balancing methodology on a case-by-case basis."4 This posi-
tion is no doubt influenced by Laudati's belief that cost economies
can be measured with sufficient accuracy to warrant their inclusion
in a quantitative tradeoff analysis.' She does not explain the con-
ditions under which an efficiencies defense should be available. She
does, however, suggest that the defense should encompass any
the New Merger Guidelines and the 1968 Merger Guidelines, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 314-15
(1982).
138. Liebeler, supra note 27, at 337.
139. Id. (emphasis added). Liebeler notes that this view is clearly at odds with the treat-
ment of efficiencies under the 1982 Guidelines. However, the 1984 Guidelines can be read to
have made a significant procedural change in this regard. See supra note 27. Liebeler appar-
ently agrees with this assessment. See Liebeler, supra note 27, at 337 ("In the New [1984]
Guidelines, the Department of Justice takes a position much more in line with the views
expressed above.").
140. See Laudati, supra note 63, at 800, 801. See also id. at 794 n.130.
141. Id. at 800. See also id. at 780-84. But see id. at 779.
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"1real'42 scale economy. 143
F. Rogers' Qualitative Tradeoff Approach
Because of the practical obstacles inherent in establishing the
existence and magnitude of efficiencies, Rogers urges adoption of a
qualitative approach to the Williamson tradeoff analysis. This ap-
proach is similar to the balancing of competitive effects under a
standard rule-of-reason analysis.'" However, as a practical matter,
it can be employed only in those cases involving marginal anticom-
petitive effects.'
45
Rogers' approach adopts a three-part methodology. First, the
merger defendants must demonstrate that other firms in the market
have cost advantages not achieved by the premerger firms. 14 6 These
relational diseconomies should be quantified whenever possible. "
Second, the impact of the merger on both the merged firms and the
142. "Real" economies confer real resource savings, improving the ability of the merged
firm to compete and, through dispersal, increasing competition in the market. See id. at 776.
See infra note 149. "Pecuniary" efficiencies result only in money savings for the firm. See
supra note 109.
143. Laudati, supra note 63, at 776. Laudati would have the defense cover a wide variety
of such economies:
Real economies usually relate directly to a production or distribution process,
and may be product-specific, plant-specific, or firm specific. Product-specific, plant-
specific, and firm-specific economies focus on various types of business behavior.
Product-specific economies are associated with the volume of any single product
made and sold. Examples of product-specific real economies are savings in machine
running time, operator attendance time, and machine set-up time that result from
production of large quantities of a specific product. A less quantifiable product-
specific scale economy is the experience and learning gained by management and
workers after producing a large volume of a specific product. Plant specific real
economies are the decline of production and distribution unit costs as plant capacity
and production increase. Costs decline partially because of the ability to specialize
factors of production. Examples of real plant scale economies include lower unit
costs in initial investment, supervision and management, maintenance, and energy
consumption. Firm-specific real economies are the decline in production and distri-
bution unit costs as firm size increases. Examples of firm scale economies include
lower unit costs resulting from specialization, massed reserves, and research and
development.
Id. at 779-80 (footnotes omitted).
144. Rogers, The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in Horizontal Mergers, 58 TUL.
L. REv. 503 (1983).
145. Id. at 544-45.
146. Id. at 532.
147. Quantification of cost economies is possible through the use of any of four empirical
methodologies: statistical cost studies, engineering studies, profitability studies, or survivor-
ship studies. Id. at 539 nn.132-36. Rogers believes that statistical cost studies and engineer-
ing studies are more precise and more suitable for purposes of tradeoff analysis because they
focus on actual cost savings of technical processes achieved through the merger. However,
both tend to ignore nontechnical efficiencies, such as improvements in research and develop-
ment or management. Id. at 540.
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market must be assessed. The merger defendants must show that
the efficiencies resulting from the transaction outweigh the costs as-
sociated with eliminating a competitor from the market, thus dem-
onstrating that the merger produces a new firm that is "better able
to compete and that the resulting firm's competitive enhancement
will produce a more competitive market." '148 This is done by estab-
lishing that the new firm has achieved (or will achieve) cost econo-
mies, and that by achieving these economies the cost advantages
enjoyed by other firms in the market have been (or will be) reduced
or eliminated. 49 This is essentially Williamson's welfare tradeoff
analysis, although expressed in nonquantitative terms. Rogers be-
lieves that these competitive effects cannot be measured with suffi-
cient mathematical precision to allow them to be quantitatively
balanced. 5° Instead, Rogers proposes a qualitative approach, simi-
lar to a standard rule-of-reason analysis. 15 ' However, Rogers does
148. Id. at 533. See also id. at 527 n.89 (to prove efficiencies, the defendant must demon-
strate that through the merger the market will become more competitive and that the same
result could not have been achieved through internal expansion).
149. Id. at 533. This requires dispersion of the efficiency gains to the market. "The dis-
persal effect (in terms of competition) occurs when the efficiency increase enhances the com-
petitive capabilities of the merged firm and that creates a more competitive relevant market."
Id. at 521 n. 71 (emphasis in original).
150. See id. at 538 n.131. Even if cost economies could be precisely quantified, Rogers
maintains that they still could not be properly injected into the Williamson tradeoff calculus.
First, it is unlikely that present measurement techniques can supply sufficiently conclusive
data to overcome the presumption of illegality created by market foreclosure evidence.
The quantitative data is not likely to be conclusive given the problems of measure-
ment and the likelihood of conflicting expert testimony. In the horizontal context,
the uncertain quantitative proof must then be measured against direct, hard evi-
dence of anticompetitive effect caused by the elimination of a market entrant and
the concomitant increase in market share to the new firm. Simply put, the tradeoff
analysis is likely to be one-sided, with the efficiency proponent unlikely to meet its
burden of proof through quantitative means. The difficulties experienced in estab-
lishing a cost justification defense to price discrimination allegations under the
Robinson-Patman Act should be instructive here.
Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). Second, the calculus itself may not be appropriate for use by
the courts:
A more fundamental problem, sometimes termed "bounded rationality," con-
fronts the use of economies in the merger context. Our legal system may simply be
ill-equipped to deal with sophisticated economic arguments put forth in an adver-
sary context. Part of the problem lies with the fact that most judges and lawyers are
not economists. But the main obstacle may arise from the incompatibility of eco-
nomic theory with the legal system as manifested in the litigation process. The
balancing of efficiency gains against competitive loss in a horizontal acquisition is
illustrative. Measuring potential operational or capital benefits to the workings of
the resulting firm against the effect of the elimination of one firm from the market
presents a real challenge to the courts' powers of perception and comprehension. If
the balance struck is an intuitive one made by a judge with a lay knowledge of
economics, it might be preferable to exclude efficiency considerations altogether.
Id. at 519 (footnote omitted). See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
151. Rogers reads the Supreme Court's opinion in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
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not provide any specific rules to employ in this qualitative balanc-
ing.15z Third, even if substantial economies are found to have re-
sulted from the acquisition, it must be established that these same
efficiencies could not have been achieved by either internal growth
by one of the merging firms 53 or through an alternative merger that
would result in greater competition.' 54 Rogers contends that the
plaintiff, not the defendant, should bear the burden of proving both
the existence of a preferable alternative merger.55 or the viability of
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), to have employed a tradeoff analysis that is essentially "qualitative"
in nature:
The Court recognized that vertically imposed customer or territorial limitations
restrict intrabrand competition but may enhance interbrand competition because of
efficiency gains in product distribution. The Court, however, did not attempt to
measure the efficiency gains, although on the other side, the loss to intrabrand com-
petition was readily ascertainable. Although the Court adopted the rule of reason, it
failed to provide any criteria for its application. Thus, while the qualitative
procompetitive value of efficiency gains was recognized, the necessity of quantifying
the gain was not addressed.
Id. at 543 (footnote omitted).
152. Rogers recognizes this:
While these parameters are admittedly nonspecific, they are in accord with the
more generalized rule of reason analysis prevalent in other antitrust contexts. That
is, if the anticompetitive effect of a given restraint is substantial, the restraint is very
likely to be ruled unreasonable, regardless of the procompetitive arguments put
forth. Recent rule of reason pronouncements appear to focus on the finding of any
substantial anticompetitive effect as the sole prerequisite to establishing unreasona-
bleness. The efficiency tradeoff analysis would operate similarly. Dependable proof
of nontrivial economies would normally fail to convince a court to permit a merger
resulting in substantial market foreclosure and increasing concentration. But that
observation should not obscure the viability of the defense to merger defendants
where the increase in market power is of questionable section 7 concern.
Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
153. Rogers believes that there is a bias implicit in section 7 favoring internal expansion:
Section 7 prohibits only growth by acquisition, and the courts have frequently
pointed to the possibility of internal (or de novo) market entry by an acquiring firm
to support a finding of illegality. Since section 7 discourages growth and entry by
acquisition, the courts generally consider internal expansion and market entry de
novo a more competitive alternative. In the horizontal merger context, internal ex-
pansion probably does have a more positive effect on competition. Merger between
competitors necessarily eliminates one market entrant, while a firm's internal
growth, with a capital investment roughly paralleling that involved in the acquisi-
tion of a competitor, normally increases market capacity and productivity without
any offsetting loss to competition.
Id. at 525-26 (footnotes omitted).
154. Id. at 534. Rogers cautions that inquiry into alternative mergers should be "limited
to those that might match or exceed the specific economies claimed by the defendant." Id.
(emphasis in original). Furthermore, the cost of the acquisition should be comparable. Id.
"These constraints eliminate the prospect of an argued relevance for largely dissimilar acqui-
sitions, perhaps more costly, which might produce more but different efficiencies." Id. (foot-
note omitted).
155. Rogers argues:
It is much simpler for the complainant to establish the existence of a preferable
alternative than for the defendant to show that no reasonable, preferable alterna-
tives exist. Further, if preferences are pinpointed by the complainant, the defend-
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internal expansion."'
With regard to the type of efficiencies that can be used to sup-
port the defense, Rogers identifies both scale economies (such as
plant scale and specialization economies, and economies in distribu-
tion, procurement, promotion, capital cost, research and develop-
ment, and management) and economies of integration, but favors
primary reliance on scale economies. 157 In the event that no single
efficiency is substantial enough to support the defense, Rogers
would allow the aggregation of several different economies.158
G. Cost Economies Outside of the Section 7 Context
Several economists have studied the existence of cost economies
outside of the section 7 context.1 59 For example, Scherer engaged in
an exhaustive study of cost economies associated with multiplant
operation in twelve industries.16 Scherer's study is similar to an
ant, to retain its efficiency defense, would be forced to confront the assertion that
the proposed alternative would produce the same or similar economies without the
concomitant lessening of competition. Alternatively, the defendant could attempt
to demonstrate the nonfeasibility of the "preferable" merger as a viable substitute
acquisition.
From a policy perspective, requiring the efficiency proponent to show no prefer-
able alternatives as part of its burden of persuasion in establishing the efficiency
defense would seem to vitiate the defense, even though the proponent had shown
the merger to be procompetitive. The statute does not require such a limited render-
ing of the defense where the economies outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the
acquisition.
Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
156. The same considerations apply here as well:
As with the preferable alternative merger issue, placing the burden of proof on the
complainant to establish the viability and propriety of internal expansion seems jus-
tified, assuming that the defendant has successfully shown the purported acquisition
to be procompetitive. To place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate the
nonfeasibility or impropriety of internal expansion would again unduly limit the
scope of the efficiency defense and would increase the ludicrous possibility that a
merger which is demonstrably procompetitive might be enjoined under section 7
simply because it is not the most procompetitive action possible. The decisions that
have pointed to the prospect of internal expansion have typically done so in the
context of reviewing an anticompetitive merger. Those cases do not necessarily es-
tablish a precedent for a combination which is, through consideration of the effi-
ciency defense, shown to be procompetitive.
Id. at 536-37 (footnotes omitted).
157. See generally id. at 528-32.
158. Id. at 532.
159. These studies are mentioned for the sole purpose of recognizing the types of cost
economies that may arise in industrial organization. For further discussion, see Scherer,
Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 16-33 (1975).
160. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMICS OF MUL.TI-PLANT OPERATION (1975). See
also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 81-
118 (1970). Scherer's study focuses on selling and promotional economies, economies in raw
material procurement, vertical integration economies, transportation cost economies, econo-
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earlier study by Bain, who, using engineering cost studies, examined
cost economies in twenty American industries. 161  Pratten per-
formed a study of twenty-six British industries employing a similar
methodology. 162 Numerous other economists have also studied the
existence and measurement of scale economies. 163
mies of massed reserves, capital raising economies, economies of product specialization, econ-
omies in central administration and staffing, and economies in research and development.
The results of his study are summarized in Scherer, Economies, supra note 159, at 17. See
generally D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS AND MANAGERIAL PERFORM-
ANCE (FTC Working Paper No. 137, 1986); D. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, supra note
82.
161. See J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 53-113 (1956). See also Bain,
Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing In-
dustries, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15-39 (March 1954). Bain does not delineate the specific types
of economies examined in his study, but it appears that his analysis is limited to production
and distribution economies. This is a more limited approach than Scherer's:
The economies of large-scale plant or firm so far referred to are economies in the
costs of producing goods (as at the factory in the case of manufacturing) and of
distributing them, in the sense of performing certain functions of physical distribu-
tion. Such functions normally include transportation, assembly, storage, and so
forth, but do not include sales promotion expenses like advertising and personal
promotional representation. In calculating the relation of scale to production-plus-
distribution expense for a firm with either one plant or multiple plants, distribution
expenses will be included only to the extent that they are either directly paid or
indirectly absorbed (totally or in regard to increments above a certain level) by the
firm in question. The shape of the scale-cost relation in a manufacturing industry
could thus be somewhat influenced by the degree of forward integration of the man-
ufacturers into distribution, though not necessarily so. In any event, nothing fur-
ther than expenses of production plus those of physical distribution has entered into
the cost-scale relationship so far described, whereas advertising and related sales-
promotion expenses have been neglected.
J.S. BAIN, BARRIERS, supra, at 64 (emphasis in original).
In another work Bain advocates amending section 7 of the Clayton Act so as to account
for merger-induced efficiencies:
The one simple rule that is obviously needed is that a merger which may substan-
tially lessen competition should be allowed if the merging firms can demonstrate
that the merger would substantially increase real efficiency in production and distri-
bution. (Demonstration that a merger would simply increase the profitability of the
merging firm should not qualify as a basis for exemption from the law.) This sort of
amendment would strengthen a very significant piece of legislation, and tend to
assure that its enforcement would be in accord with accepted principles of economic
rationality.
J.S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 11, at 658. See also Bain, Discussion, supra note 11, at 64-
66.
162. See C.F. PRATEN, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (1971);
C.F. PRATTEN & R.M. DEAN, THE ECONOMIES OF LARGE-SCALE PRODUCTION IN BRITISH
INDUSTRY (1965); Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice, 82 ECON. J. 369-91
(1972). Pratten examines minimal operating scale in terms of production and material costs
only.
163. See, eg., Haldi & Whitcomb, Economies of Scale in Industrial Plants, 75 J. POL.
ECON. 75 (August 1967); Moore, Economies of Scale: Some Statistical Evidence, 73 Q. J.
ECON. 232-45 (May 1959); Stigler, The Economies of Scale, J. LAW & ECON. 54-71 (October
1958). Literature surveys of these and other studies appear in J. JOHNSTON, STATISTICAL
COST ANALYSIS (1960); C.A. SMITH, BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 213-
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IV. COST EFFICIENCIES IN AMERICAN MEDICAL
INTERNATIONAL
The FTC's opinion in American Medical International"6 is the
most recent 165 exposition on efficiencies by either of the antitrust
enforcement agencies. On its facts and holding, the American Med-
ical International decision is quite unremarkable; 166 instead, what is
striking is how the Commission seized that case to abandon its posi-
tion under the 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement and embrace effi-
ciencies as a full-fledged defense in horizontal merger litigation.
In 1979, American Medical International (AMI), the nation's
third largest proprietary hospital chain, acquired French Hospital
in San Luis Obispo, California. French was one of five acute care
facilities located in San Luis Obispo, three of which were owned by
AMI through prior acquisitions. In 1981, prior to the announce-
ment of the 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement, the Commission
charged 167 that the acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act
and section 2 of the Sherman Act, 168 and requested that AMI be
compelled to divest French and obtain prior approval from the
Commission for future hospital acquisitions.
In conjunction with its claim that the acquisition was impliedly
immune 169 from antitrust scrutiny by operation of the National
38 (1955); McGee, Efficiency and Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 55-97 (1975); Walters, Production and Cost Functions: An Econometric Sur-
vey, 31 ECONOMETRICA 1-66 (Jan.- Apr. 1963).
164. 104 F.T.C. 177 (1984).
165. The Federal Trade Commission did examine efficiencies more recently in Hospital
Corporation of America, Docket No. 9161 (F.T.C. Oct. 25, 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th
Cir. 1986), but in that case relied primarily on American Medical International and provided
no additional substantive analysis of the efficiencies doctrine.
166. See infra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.
167. 104 F.T.C. 1, 1-5 (original FTC complaint). For more detail regarding the specific
allegations in the complaint, see the Commission's summary on appeal. American Medical
International, 104 F.T.C. at 177 n.1.
168. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
169. AMI contended that the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300s (1983), conflicted with
the antitrust laws in that its effectiveness was dependant on voluntary cooperation among
providers that might be proscribed by the antitrust laws. Because of this conflict, AMI ar-
gued that an implied repeal of the antitrust laws was mandated, and that its acquisition of
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Health Planning and Resources Development Act, 7 ° AMI argued
that its planned consolidation of French with another of its nearby
hospitals would produce substantial cost savings. These cost sav-
ings would come in several forms: operating cost savings; 171 one-
time capital cost savings; 172 additional unit cost savings from econo-
mies of scale;173 savings from the elimination of duplication of
equipment; 74 and savings in the form of service quality enhance-
ment.' 75  AMI's efficiencies claims primarily relied on a study pre-
pared by one of its subsidiaries which outlined the proposed
consolidation of the two facilities, and a later study prepared specifi-
cally for trial that quantified the expected cost savings. 176 Adminis-
trative Law Judge Barnes rejected AMI's claimed efficiencies,
concluding that AMI had actually taken few steps towards consoli-
dation and that AMI's cost savings study was unreliable. Judge
Barnes further cited the difficulties inherent in accurately quanti-
fying these savings and in balancing them against the anticipated
increase in market power resulting from the acquisition.'
77
French should be immune from antitrust scrutiny. For a discussion of precedent examining
the implied immunity argument in the health care context, see BoIze & Pennak, Reconcilia-
tion of the Sherman Act With Federal Health-Planning Legislation: Implied Antitrust Immu-
nity in the Health Care Field, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 225 (1984).
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300s (1983).
171. AMI projected a 5% cost savings resulting from consolidation. AMI Reply Brief on
Appeal at 18, American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. 177 [hereinafter Reply Brief].
In estimating these anticipated operating expense savings, AMI assumed that the hospital at
which a particular medical service was consolidated would provide the service at the lower
unit cost presently being achieved by either of the hospitals. AMI Brief on Appeal at 34,
American Medical International, Inc, 104 F.T.C. 177 [hereinafter Appeal Brief].
172. AMI contended that without consolidating, AMI's other hospital would need to be
physically expanded to alleviate current space constraints, costing approximately $21 million.
However, consolidation of the two hospitals at a cost of approximately $9 million would
alleviate the need for expansion and thus result in a capital cost savings of approximately $12
million. See Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 35.
173. AMI claimed that unit costs would decline because consolidation would result in
combined patient volumes for particular services that were larger than those experienced at
either hospital individually. Since AMI estimated its operating cost savings at experienced
unit costs, see supra note 171, additional operating cost savings would result from lower unit
costs. See Appeal Brief, supra note 171, at 35.
174. AMI argued that because of consolidation there would be no need for two separate
departments to purchase identical medical equipment when the consolidated patient volume
only justified one. See id. at 35, 37.
175. See id. at 38. AMI maintained that the acquisition would enhance quality of patient
care "by facilitating higher volumes in each of the consolidated specialty areas" and by "re-
liev[ing] scheduling problems which presently exist in each of the hospital's operating
rooms." See Reply Brief, supra note 171, at 21. See also id. at 21 n.32. AMI made no at-
tempt to quantify these quality-enhancing efficiencies. See id. at 21 n.31.
176. Appeal Brief, supra note 171, at 32.
177. See American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 213-14. The Commission
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Interestingly, it was the FTC Complaint counsel, not AMI, who
initially raised the application of efficiencies as a substantive merger
defense on appeal. AMI had previously argued efficiencies only in
the context of its implied immunity argument. On appeal, AMI
contended that precedent purportedly rejecting the efficiencies de-
fense was inapposite since no case had involved the hospital indus-
try, an area where Congress sought to encourage the achievement of
efficiencies through joint planning action.t"' Complaint counsel, for
its part, did not limit its discussion of efficiencies to the context of
AMI's implied immunity contention; instead, it attacked AMI's
claim under the FTC's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement, arguing
that AMI did not satisfy the criteria for recognizing efficiencies at
the prosecutorial discretion stage. 179 However, in a footnote Com-
plaint counsel noted Chairman Miller's position, as asserted in the
1982 Horizontal Merger Statement, that scale-type efficiencies
should be recognized as a legally-cognizable defense in merger anal-
ysis, 180 and that Competition Bureau Director Muris now urged the
Commission to use this case to adopt Chairman Miller's position.'
Accordingly, Complaint counsel argued that AMI failed to satisfy
its burden of establishing by substantial and reliable evidence that:
(1) measurable efficiencies would be achieved; (2) the cost savings
were true efficiencies and did not merely reflect the lower quality or
ultimately upheld Judge Barnes' initial decision finding liability under section 7 and ordering
AMI to divest French. For a thorough analysis of this initial decision, including Judge
Barnes' examination of AMI's efficiencies claims, see Miles, Hospital Mergers and the Anti-
trust Laws: An Overview, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 253, 278-87 (1984).
178. Appeal Brief, supra note 171, at 34 n.41. AMI's approach to the efficiencies argu-
ment can be best described as schizophrenic. In its Appeal Brief, AMI argued that the effi-
ciencies defense did not apply, but then cited various legal authorities (law review articles and
texts authored by Williamson, Muris, and Areeda and Turner, discussed at supra notes 83-
112) that have examined efficiencies in the section 7 context. See Appeal Brief, supra note
171, at 35 n.45. AMI apparently did this with the expectation that the applicable standard
under which its efficiencies argument would be judged would be that set forth in the Commis-
sion's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement. Of course that Statement precluded consideration
of efficiencies outside of the prosecutorial discretion context and thus barred their considera-
tion in this case.
AMI adhered to this schizophrenic approach in its Reply Brief as well. Compare Reply
Brief, supra note 171, at 18 n.26 with Appeal Brief, supra note 171, at n.27. Notwithstanding
Complaint counsel's emphasis in its Staff Answering Brief on the efficiencies standard under
the Commission's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement, AMI did not anticipate that the Com-
mission would abandon the 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement and announce a more lenient
efficiencies standard. Note that this case was argued and briefed before the release of the
1984 Merger Guidelines by the Antitrust Division on June 14, 1984.
179. See FTC Staff Answering Brief at 58, American Medical International, Inc., 104
F.T.C. 177 [hereinafter Answering Brief].
180. See supra note 29, infra note 196 and accompanying text.
181. Answering Brief, supra note 179, at 58 n.81.
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quantity of health care services produced at lower costs; (3) the effi-
ciencies could not have been achieved as quickly absent the merger;
and (4) the cost savings clearly outweighed the adverse conse-
quences resulting from an increase in market power. 
1 2
The goal that the Commission set for itself in American Medical
International is obvious. Although it rejected AMI's implied im-
munity argument and could have easily avoided considering effi-
ciencies in the antitrust context altogether since the issue of
efficiencies was properly raised only in the context of this implied
immunity argument, the Commission instead entertained efficien-
cies as a full-fledged antitrust defense, albeit in dicta only. The
Commission dismissed Supreme Court precedent-Brown Shoe,
Philadelphia National Bank, Phillipsburg National Bank, and
Procter & Gamble I83 -finding that the Supreme Court did not in
fact entertain an efficiencies defense in those cases,'8 4 and concluded
that lower courts' reliance on language contained in these opinions
for rejecting an efficiencies defense was misplaced.'8 5 Instead, the
Commission found that language appearing in several more recent
cases, such as Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 86 United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 87 and United States v. Marine Bancorpo-
ration, 188 mandated consideration of efficiencies in antitrust analysis
in general, and in horizontal merger analysis in particular. 8 9
Examining the evidence of efficiencies introduced by AMI, the
Commission concluded that AMI did not satisfy "any of the criteria
set forth by any of the authorities"' 90 for assertion of an efficiencies
defense. The Commission also enumerated what it deemed to be
the relevant criteria for invoking efficiencies as a defense as follows:
the proponent of the efficiencies must establish by substantial evi-
dence that (1) substantial cost savings will result from the acquisi-
tion; (2) these efficiencies are already enjoyed by one or more firms
in the industry; (3) these efficiencies could not be achieved within a
comparable period of time through a merger threatening less com-
182. See id. at 59.
183. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
184. See American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 217.
185. Id. at 215.
186. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). There, the Court stated that the rule of reason analysis requires
the fact-finder to "weigh all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id. at
49.
187. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
188. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
189. See American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 217.
190. See id. at 219.
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petitive harm; (4) the cost savings will inure to the benefit of con-
sumers (i.e., market forces oblige the firm to pass cost savings
efficiencies on to consumers); and (5) these efficiencies outweigh any
increase in market power that may result from the acquisition. t91
Interestingly, the Commission did not cite its 1982 Horizontal
Merger Statement to support this, 192 nor Chairman Miller's dissent-
ing view in that Statement, 193 nor the efficiencies discussion in
either AMI's or Complaint counsel's briefs. t9 4
American Medical International is significant because, in many
respects, it can be read as a revised statement by the Commission of
its position on efficiencies, intended to reflect current economic
thinking on the proper role of efficiencies in merger analysis. t95
Certainly, efficiencies now will be considered beyond the
prosecutorial discretion stage and as a legally-cognizable defense.
This represents a victory for Chairman Miller. t96 It equally repre-
sents victory for Bureau Director Muris, whose article was relied
191. See id. at 219-20. AMI implicitly attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to shift the bur-
den of establishing the non-existence of some of the claimed efficiencies. Regarding its claim
that quality-enhancement efficiencies would result from the acquisition, AMI argued:
Complaint counsel labels several of these programs 'non-quality efficiencies' and
asserts that the resulting cost savings 'are at best of little magnitude.' Complaint
counsel presents no support for this claim, nor does he explain what he means by
'non-quality efficiencies.' . . . [C]omplaint counsel's assertion that the cost savings
from such programs are 'of little magnitude' is unsupported by any record
evidence.
Reply Brief, supra note 169, at 21-22 n.32 (citations omitted). See supra note 27 and accom-
panying text.
192. However, the opinion did cite to the Antitrust Division's new 1984 Merger Guide-
lines. See infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
193. Miller would have required that the Commission consider scale economies only.
DOJ 1984 GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3.5, at 6901-5 n.2.
194. See supra notes 169-82 and accompanying text.
195. This is underscored in Hospital Corporation of America, where the Commission re-
lied heavily on its treatment of efficiencies in the American Medical International decision.
See Hospital Corp. of Am., supra note 165, at 109. Note that both opinions for the Commis-
sion were authored by Commissioner Calvani.
196. Accord, Clanton, supra note 30, at 345 ("[T]he FTC also has departed from its 1982
Policy Statement and unanimously accepted an efficiencies defense in its recent AMI opin-
ion.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). One recent commentary states that the
Commission's Bureau of Economics and Bureau of Competition had considered cost savings
in merger litigation even before the Commission's decision in American Medical Interna-
tional. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 2 n.5.
Commissioners Pertschuk and Bailey, who disagreed with Chairman Miller on this point,
wrote separate opinions in American Medical International. Oddly, they made no mention
whatsoever of the Commission's departure from its treatment of efficiencies in its 1982 Hori-
zontal Merger Statement. See 104 F.T.C. at 227-37. Commissioner Bailey similarly failed to
make any mention of this policy departure in her separate opinion in Hospital Corporation of
America. Commissioner Pertschuk had left the Commission prior to the Hospital Corpora-
tion of America decision.
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upon by the Commission in the opinion for at least one important
point: American Medical International indicates that the Commis-
sion will consider all types of efficiencies, not just scale economies as
Chairman Miller urged.1 97 Notwithstanding this, the Commission
appears in some respects to have announced a much more qualified
defense than Muris suggested. Although several of the Commis-
sion's requirements are implicit in the Muris efficiencies model (for
example, that substantial cost savings result from the acquisition
and that the cost savings inure to the benefit of consumers), 198
others are not (such as the requirement that these efficiencies al-
ready be enjoyed by one or more firms in the industry and that they
cannot be achievable through a less anticompetitive acquisition).199
Moreover, the Commission imposes a case-by-case analysis of these
efficiencies (in that the efficiencies "clearly outweigh any increase in
market power" that may result from the acquisition),2" a remnant
of the Commission's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement2e ' and also,
of course, a departure from the Muris efficiencies model.2 °2
Viewing American Medical International strictly as a policy pro-
nouncement as it must be, since its discussion of efficiencies was not
required for adjudication of the appeal,2 °3 the opinion has several
major shortcomings. First, it contains no explanation for its depar-
ture from the treatment of efficiencies in the Commission's 1982
Horizontal Merger Statement, and it does not indicate whether any
197. Of course, it may be that Chairman Miller subscribed to Muris' view (that all types
of efficiencies should be considered) but, for political reasons, moderated his position, hoping
that the Commission would adopt it in its 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement. The Commis-
sion did not.
198. See supra notes 104, 109 and accompanying text.
199. See American Medical International, In., 104 F.T.C. at 219.
200. Id. at 220. One commentator has recently suggested that the case-by-case analysis
of efficiencies by the antitrust enforcement agencies is not necessarily inconsistent with rejec-
tion of an efficiencies defense in any context where the courts are called on to engage in
merger analysis. See Note, Antitrust Implications of a Joint Venture: Is An Efficiencies Justi-
fication Justifiable?, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1219, 1227-28 (1985). As a general matter, these
agencies, which are staffed by industrial economists, are more competent than judges, who for
the most part are not economists, to assess the economic consequences of a particular acquisi-
tion. See id. Compare with supra notes 124, 149 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. See also Reply Brief, supra note
171, at 18 n.27.
203. The Commission found that "AMI's acquisiton of French Hospital has and will
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly of general accute care health
services.., in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act." 104 F.T.C. at 220. In coming to this conclusion, however, the Commis-
sion did not need to consider the efficiencies defense in any context other than as a cost
reduction and an element of the implied immunity argument.
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portion of the Statement's treatment of efficiencies still survives.
The important differences between the treatment of efficiencies in
the two are obvious: the Statement's consideration of measurable
operating efficiencies only, as opposed to all efficiencies in American
Medical International, including many that defy quantification (e.g.,
quality service enhancement), and the Statement's consideration of
efficiencies as a matter of prosecutorial discretion only, as opposed
to American Medical International's full-fledged merger defense.
These differences raise many questions that antitrust lawyers will
confront when formulating an efficiencies defense in an FTC case.
For instance, must all the requirements announced in American
Medical International be met for recognition of efficiencies at the
prosecutional discretion stage? The consideration of efficiencies at
that stage should arguably impose less stringent requirements. Sec-
ond, although the opinion approves of the treatment of efficiencies
by the 1984 Guidelines (which neither of the parties cited in their
briefs), it does not attempt to harmonize those requirements with
the requirements imposed in the opinion." Although the influence
of the 1984 Guidelines is apparent (to such a degree that the opin-
ion perhaps may be regarded as the Commission's response to the
Antitrust Division's revision of its 1982 Merger Guidelines), 0 5 im-
portant differences may still exist. For example, the Antitrust Divi-
sion no longer regards efficiencies strictly as a "defense," whereas
the Commission still does.20 6 Third, although by setting forth these
204. See American Medical International Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 219. Note that the Antitrust
Division's 1984 Merger Guidelines were issued on June 14, 1984, less than three weeks before
the Commission issued the American Medical International opinion on July 2, 1984.
205. The Commission's reliance on the 1984, and not the 1982, DOJ Guidelines is clear.
For instance, the 1982 Merger Guidelines permitted consideration of efficiencies "only in
resolving otherwise close cases," see supra note 23 and accompanying text, whereas the 1984
Guidelines, like the policy announced by the Commission in American Medical International,
mandates their consideration in all cases. But see supra note 26 and accompanying text (stan-
dards under 1982 and 1984 Guidelines are similar in practice).
This is not a semantical difference only. As a practical matter, the consideration of effi-
ciencies in "all" cases may only make a difference in the "close case;" arguably, then, there
may be little difference between the approach of the 1982 Guidelines and the current practice
under the 1984 Guidelines and American Medical International. However, the current ap-
proach will certainly create differences in merger litigation as it is more relaxed and certainly
mandates broader relevancy and broader admissibility standards for evidence of such
efficiencies.
206. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Arguably, this could be considered a
semantic difference only since these authorities require the proponent of the efficiencies
claims to establish their existence by "substantial evidence" (in American Medical Interna-
tional) and by "clear and convincing evidence" (in the 1984 Merger Guidelines). Compare
American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 219, with DOJ 1984 MERGER GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 2. Of course, the opinion in American Medical International provides no
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requirements the Commission identifies the task for the antitrust
lawyer arguing an efficiencies defense, the opinion offers little gui-
dance how that task can be accomplished. For instance, must all
claimed efficiencies be quantified? Quantification of quality en-
hancement will be extremely difficult.2 °7 Also, given the fact that
section 7 analysis is largely prospective in nature (and in most cases
the cost savings will result from expected efficiencies, not efficiencies
already realized), should a "risk factor" be included that reflects the
"probability" that the cost savings will actually be achieved? Also,
should the procompetitive value ascribed to these cost savings be
discounted to reflect the time that will be needed to actually achieve
them and to enhance consumer welfare, either by lowering prices or
generating higher quality?2 s0  This short-coming-lack of gui-
dance-is crucial, given the substantial difficulties inherent in a
case-by-case analysis of efficiencies, and especially in balancing effi-
ciencies against the anticompetitive effects resulting from an
acquisition.
American Medical International was in many respects a simple
merger case. 209 AMI possessed a significant share of the relevant
market both before and after its acquisition of French Hospital, and
market concentration under the Herfindahl-Hirschman index was
extremely high.210 Except for several interesting issues that the
Commission quickly disposed of-such as AMI's implied immunity
argument 21 and AMI's contention that traditional merger analysis
was inapplicable because there was no price or non-price competi-
tion within the health care services market2 2 -the American Medi-
cal International opinion confronted no novel issue.213 In the final
analysis, the Commission's treatment of efficiencies will undoubt-
guidance as to what constitutes "substantial evidence" and whether that standard differs, as a
matter of law, from "clear and convincing evidence." Note, however, that the Commission
in American Medical International chose to retain the "substantial evidence" standard from
the 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement and not to adopt the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard from the 1984 Merger Guidelines. This alone suggests that some difference between
the two may in fact exist.
207. Accord, Fisher, supra note 4, at 37-39 & n.68.
208. Id. at 22, 39.
209. Miles, Hospital Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: An Overview, 29 ANTrrRUST BULL.
253, 284 (1984).
210. See American Medical International, Ina, 104 F.T.C. at 201.
211. See id. at 185-90. See also supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
212. See American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 178-85.
213. The Commission's finding on another interesting issue, the appropriateness of a
prior notification requirement (as opposed to a prior approval requirement) as a section 7
remedy, can be limited largely to the facts of this case and the peculiar nature of the market
for hospital acquisitions. See id. at 221-27; American Medical International, Inc., 104 F.T.C.
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edly prove to be the opinion's most significant and lasting contribu-
tion to the law of merger analysis, as it was probably intended to be.
V. CONCLUSION: THE DIRECTION OF EFFICIENCIES
IN THE FUTURE
A critical review of the treatment of efficiencies in the case law
and the economics literature suggests one inescapable conclusion: a
more explicit and detailed statement of the multivariate role of effi-
ciencies in merger analysis is badly needed. The failure of recent
pronouncements on efficiencies-the Antitrust Division's 1984
Guidelines and the FTC's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement-to
adequately address critical issues relating to the role of efficiencies
in merger analysis, or to reflect the current state of the law, has
resulted in continued distortion of the efficiencies doctrine. Because
of the multi-jurisdictional nature of antitrust enforcement-with
the FTC and Antitrust Division having dual jurisdiction over sec-
tion 7,214 and private section 7 litigation in federal courts that is not
necessarily governed by the policy pronouncements of either of the
two antitrust enforcement agencies2 15-there is a substantial risk
that the efficiencies doctrine will evolve in unintended and perhaps
even grossly inconsistent directions. The existence of a coherent,
well-reasoned role for efficiencies in merger analysis requires, at the
minimum, a coordinated policy between the FTC and the Antitrust
Division and legislative guidelines that govern the diverse
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of the FTC, the Antitrust
Division, and the federal courts.
The infirmities of a case-by-case, agency-by-agency development
of the efficiencies doctrine is illustrated best by the Commission's
decision in American Medical International. That decision's ex-
plicit departure from the Commission's 1982 Horizontal Merger
Statement has already been extensively analyzed.216 Is anything left
617 (1984) (opinion considering prior notification order in response to motion for
reconsideration).
214. Section 15 of the Clayton Act empowers the Antitrust Division to enforce section 7.
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1983). Section I 1 grants concurrent jurisdiction to the Federal Trade Com-
mission. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1983). The Commission also shares jurisdiction over section 7 by
virtue of the broad reach of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1983). See, e.g., FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 28 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973) (every violation of
section 7 is a violation of section 5). See generally Roll, Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC The Liaison Procedure, 31 Bus. LAWYER
2075, 2076-77 (1976) (detailing substantive areas of overlapping jurisdiction).
215. See supra note 70. See also A.B.A. Antitrust Section, supra note 47, at 148.
216. See supra notes 164-213 and accompanying text.
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of the Commission's position on efficiencies in the 1982 Horizontal
Merger Statement? What is the effect of American Medical Interna-
tional on the fate of efficiencies at the Commission, given that its
discussion of efficiencies was purely dicta? How will the required
efficiencies showing differ, in terms of quality of proof or standards
of proof, at the prosecutorial discretion and adjudicative stages?
And given the many different postures that merger litigation can
undertake1 7 as well as the delay inherent in the adjudication of sec-
tion 7 cases, 18 what must a defendant demonstrate at trial in order
to successfully invoke the efficiencies defense? For instance, must
the defendant show that efficiencies were likely to occur at time of
suit, although they in fact may not have occurred by time of
trial?219 That efficiencies have been accomplished since the filing of
suit, although they may or may have appeared likely to occur when
suit was instituted?220  Or perhaps notwithstanding the failure to
achieve efficiencies by the time of trial, that it appears likely that
substantial efficiencies will be achieved in the future? Antitrust law-
yers must examine issues such as these in formulating an efficiencies
defense in merger litigation, and often must deal with these same
issues peripherally in making a competitive analysis of a proposed
acquisition. Unfortunately, critical questions such as these remain
largely unanswered. To simply extend the application of the effi-
ciencies doctrine to the adjudicatory stage without providing any
217. Even in cases involving only the FTC, merger litigation can take many forms. These
may include a preliminary injunction request prior to consummation of the transaction, adju-
dication at the administrative level after the transaction has been either consummated or
abandoned, or review of a Commission administrative ruling at the Court of Appeals level.
Antitrust Division challenges and private section 7 litigation may also entail other postures.
218. One study of merger litigation between 1950 and 1972 found that the average dura-
tion of the litigation was approximately three years, with some cases lasting over five years
and others lasting less than a year and a half. Weston, Section 7 Enforcement: Implementa-
tion of Outmoded Theories, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1411, 1449 (1980). See also A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No. 3, EXPEDITING PRETRIALS AND TRIALS OF ANTITRUST
CASES I, n.1 (1979).
219. Although issues such as these would technically be governed by the time of suit
doctrine (in conjunction with the case law relating to post-acquisition evidence), the law in
those areas does not provide any clear guidance. See A.B.A. Antitrust Section, supra note 47,
at 161-63. For instance, at least one decision has questioned the credibility of post-acquisi-
tion evidence that is subject to the control of the merging parties, which post-acquisition
efficiencies certainly would be. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,
504-05 (1974). But, from a public policy perspective, such efficiencies should clearly be con-
sidered. Moreover, these doctrines do not address the evidentiary value that is to be given to
efficiencies not yet achieved or efficiencies actually achieved but not anticipated at the time of
the acquisition.
220. A current case to follow regarding these issues is the Antitrust Division's challenge
of the 1982 acquisition of the corn wet milling operations of Nabisco Brands, Inc. by Archer-
Daniels-Midland Company (S.D. Iowa, Civil No. 83-51-D).
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real guidelines for its application, as the Commission did in Ameri-
can Medical International, does more harm than good. In light of
the dearth of ongoing section 7 litigation (both within the FTC and
in private litigation), the antitrust enforcement agencies cannot real-
istically rely upon litigated cases for the development of a coherent
set of guidelines for use in merger analysis.
An even more compelling argument in favor of a unified policy
statement is the difference that persists between the Antitrust Divi-
sion's 1984 Merger Guidelines and the FTC's 1982 Horizontal
Merger Statement (even as "amended" by American Medical Inter-
national)221 on the proper role of efficiencies in merger analysis.
The underlying problem is that the language in section 7 is suffi-
ciently general and vague that the two antitrust enforcement agen-
cies, and the courts in private section 7 litigation, can reach
different, although equally valid, positions. The simple political re-
ality is that the Antitrust Division and FTC's dual jurisdiction over
enforcement of section 7, notwithstanding past efforts to eliminate
it,22 2 is here to stay, and antitrust lawyers must consider the policy
pronouncements of both antitrust enforcement agencies when as-
sessing the competitive impact of a proposed transaction. Even
granting American Medical International full effect as a valid public
policy pronouncement by the Commission,223 important differences
still exist between the required efficiencies showing.224 Although
the long-standing liaison agreement between the Antitrust Division
and the FTC 2 5 has functioned in the past to prevent or settle juris-
dictional disputes in individual cases, and past practice enables law-
yers in many instances to predict accurately what agency will obtain
221. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
222. Dual enforcement creates unnecessary costs including the duplication of enforce-
ment resources and the danger of inconsistent public policies. In 1981, the Reagan adminis-
tration unsuccessfully proposed elimination of dual jurisdiction. See generally Kirkpatrick,
Elman, Pitofsky & Baxter, Debate: The Federal Trade Commission Under Attack. Should
the Commission's Role Be Changed?, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1481 (1980); Roll, supra note 214.
223. Technically speaking, the efficiencies discussion in American Medical International
should be ignored as dicta and the Commission's 1982 Horizontal Merger Statement should
be deemed controlling. See supra note 203. The "precedential" effect of this decision in all
likelihood would not be a problem for counsel arguing a case at the prosecutorial discretion
stage since, presumably, the Commission would properly limit the effect of American Medical
International. However, this would create major uncertainty if the case were in any other
legal posture.
224. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
225. See generally Roll, supra note 214, at 2077-80. Under the terms of a 1948 memoran-
dum agreement outlining the liaison procedure, the Antitrust Division and the FTC consult




clearance to review a particular transaction,22 6 these differences
cannot be entirely dismissed.227 Certainly from a public policy per-
spective, the legality of a transaction that may have consequences
for U.S. industrial competitiveness in world markets should not
turn in large measure on which particular agency obtains clearance
to review the transaction.
One very damaging effect of the failure to address critical issues
relating to the use of efficiencies in merger analysis is the continued
distortion that the efficiencies doctrine suffers in order to meet polit-
ical exigencies. Because of important commerce issues that are
often involved, political pressure (subtle or otherwise)22 from other
branches of the government is often brought to the antitrust agency
reviewing the transaction, as was evident in the General Motors-
Toyota229 and LTV-Republi 230 cases. To the extent personnel
226. Where both agencies express an interest in handling a particular case, the decision
-which often is the result of intense negotiations between the two agencies-is generally
based on relative expertise with the subject matter or industry as well as staff availability. As
a practical matter, some knowledge of the enforcement activities of the two agencies will
enable counsel to predict this (e.g., the Commission investigates automobile parts-related
transactions and the Antitrust Division investigates transactions in the computer industry).
However, many gray areas exist.
For a detailed list identifying substantive areas of expertise between the two agencies, as
well as gray areas, see Roll, supra note 214, at 2079-80. Occasionally, despite review, but not
formal clearance by one agency, the other has sued. See A.B.A. ANTITRusT SEcTIoN, supra
note 70, at 28 & n.1 10 (examining Nestle Alimentana's acquisition of Stouffer Corporation).
227. Of course, this is a problem principally in the context of counsel's competitive analy-
sis of a proposed acquisition. Once clearance is granted to one of the agencies, the efficiencies
arguments can be modeled to that agency's efficiencies guidelines. This problem also arises in
the private section 7 litigation context to the extent that the court chooses to rely on the
merger guidelines of one agency or the other.
228. This pressure can take many forms: congressional correspondence or other commu-
nications, including hearings; announcements of "interest" by other executive departments or
federal agencies (although, of course, at all times professing noninvolvement and advocating
impartiality); and constituent correspondence and visits. Because many upper-level bureau-
crats often perceive their political, and vocational, careers to be at risk in such major deci-
sions, this concern should not be dismissed in considering the agency decisionmaking process.
For an account of the politically-charged atmosphere surrounding the Commission's review
of the Champion-St. Regis transaction (although not illustrating distortion of the efficiencies
doctrine), see Champion-St Regis Merger Hits Snag as Calvani Threatens Injunction Vote,
FTC:WATCH No. 196, 2-4 (Sept. 28, 1984). See also Low-Key Oliver Takes Command of
FTC: Arrives Without Staff "Boarding Party," FTC:WATCH No. 232, 2-4 (April 25, 1986).
229. See supra note 32. Although General Motors and Toyota requested Commission
approval for their joint venture in February 1983, the matter was not sent to the full Commis-
sion for a decision until December 1983, after the departure of Commissioner Clanton and
after the arrival of Commissioner Calvani, who had been a much more ardent supporter of
Chairman Miller's agenda-when a 3-2 majority (which in fact was the result) appeared as-
sured. At that time, Clanton was at best only an occasional ally of Chairman Miller and has
since written critically of the Commission's decision in the General Motors-Toyota case. See
Clanton, supra note 32.
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within the antitrust agency decides to "yield" to such pressure,
notwithstanding a compelling legal case weighing against the
merger, lines of antitrust analysis that permit flexibility and provide
leeway are often used to achieve the desired result. The vagueness
of the parameters of the efficiencies doctrine in merger analysis and
the latitude present within the doctrine itself have permitted the
Antitrust Division and the FTC to use efficiencies to justify what
might otherwise be objectionable transactions. 23' From a public
policy perspective, there is nothing inherently wrong with allowing
agency decisionmaking to reflect current political thinking. How-
ever, the cost of doing so is the damage to antitrust theory from
molding doctrine to achieve the immediate politically desired result
in a particular case. The resulting distortion in the efficiencies doc-
trine produces both intrinsic and extrinsic harm. By altering the
230. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. Although the Antitrust Division ulti-
mately approved the LTV-Republic transaction, in part on claimed efficiencies grounds, see
LTV-Republic Steel Merger- Justice Clearance 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,465, at
56,125 (April 9, 1984), that decision was a near complete reversal of the Antitrust Division's
decision several weeks earlier to oppose the transaction. See Department of Justice, Merger
Policy - LTV Republic, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,462, at 56,116 (March 19, 1984). In
between the two decisions, then Assistant Attorney General McGrath reportedly had been
subjected to pressure, both publicly and privately, from the Commerce Department and the
White House to approve the transaction. Compare 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1152, 270 (Feb. 16, 1984) (McGrath reports there is little or no basis for the claimed
efficiencies) and 46 Antitrust Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1156, 502 (Mar. 15, 1984) (Mc-
Grath is criticized; requires factual showing of efficiency) with 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1157, 577 (Mar. 22, 1984) (McGrath conditionally approves merger, admit-
ting that White House gave the message that Justice Department should decide this matter).
Although the later decision to approve the transaction required the divestiture of two Repub-
lic steel plants, McGrath characterized the claimed efficiency gains, which he had previously
rejected out-of-hand, to be "of interest." Id. at 577. In initially rejecting the proposed trans-
action, McGrath stated:
We also considered the claim by the companies that the merger would permit
substantial cost savings and that these savings are important if Jones & Laughlin
and Republic are to continue as competitive factors in an increasingly difficult mar-
ketplace. The companies asserted that the merger would reduce operating expenses
by more than $300 million per year. It was clear from our study, however, that there
was little or no basis for many of the claimed efficiencies. In addition, a number of
them could be realized without merging the two companies, through internal cost
savings, supply contracts among the companies and perhaps even the swapping of
plants and other assets among companies in the industry.
Merger Policy---LTVRepublic, supra, at 56,116 (emphasis added). But several weeks later, in
approving the proposed transaction, McGrath retreated from his previous position: -[v]hile
we [previously] questioned many of the efficiency claims of Republic and LTV, there is reason
to believe that a merged company may recognize some efficiencies." Justice Clearance, supra,
at 56,126 (deleting footnote detailing efficiencies to be achieved).
231. Note that both General Motors-Toyota and LTV-Republic were decisions whether
to exercise prosecutorial discretion by challenging the transaction. It is unlikely that blatant
political pressure of this variety would ever be exerted on the Commission in its adjudicative
role, although much more subtle forms of pressure are imaginable.
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doctrine so as to accommodate political pressure, this practice
pushes the doctrine in unintended directions 3 ' and invites antitrust
lawyers in future cases to employ the distorted doctrine in a manner
virtually indistinguishable from this "seminal" case but, nonethe-
less, in a manner that the agency cannot sanction. 33 This raises
both the costs of making a transaction and the costs of reviewing a
transaction once it is made. However, a singular statement of the
efficiencies doctrine, setting forth detailed guidelines for employing
efficiencies at both the prosecutorial discretion and adjudicatory
stages, would eliminate the vagueness that can be used to accommo-
date political pressure and reduce distortion, thereby maintaining
the doctrine's integrity.
Putting aside these normative issues, it is important to recognize
the niche that the efficiencies doctrine occupies in antitrust law. Be-
ginning with the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Continental
T V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.2 34 abandoning the per se rule for
vertical nonprice restrictions, per se and presumptive rules of ille-
gality have suffered a steady decline. The Court fell just short of
abandoning the rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance
in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service,2 31 and actually did so for
efficiency-enhancing horizontal agreements in Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System,2 36 NCAA v. Board of Regents,2 37
and Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Print-
ing.2 38 The Court's opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.
232. For instance, after General Motors-Toyota, the Commission's policy on efficiencies
presumably must now be regarded as including management efficiencies of a nonquantifiable
variety. See supra note 32.
233. Immediately after the General Motors-Toyota decision, Warner Communications,
Inc. requested Commission approval for its joint venture with PolyGram Records, Inc.,
which essentially was the merger of each operation's prerecorded music business. The parties
argued that the joint venture would yield efficiencies and procompetitive benefits. Polygram,
which was strong in the classical music area, had distribution problems in the United States,
and Warner was relatively weak both abroad and in the classical music area. The parties also
claimed that their labels would continue to operate with creative autonomy. Despite "pack-
aging" the proposal similar to the General Motors-Toyota joint venture, especially with re-
gard to the claimed efficiencies, the Commission rejected the parties' contentions. See Joint
Venture Would Lessen Competition in Prerecorded Music Industry, FTC Charges, 46 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 645 (March 29, 1984); Ninth Circuit Blocks Warner-
Polygram Venture in Prerecorded Music Industry, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
760 (April 19, 1984). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later upheld the Commission.
See FTC v. Warner Communications, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984).
234. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
235. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
236. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
237. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
238. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
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2 v. Hyde,2 39 while technically retaining the per se rule prohibiting
typing arrangements, 2' resembled more a standard rule-of-reason
analysis than the application of a traditional per se rule.24
Although the per se rule has never had a place in merger analysis
under section 7, quantitative merger analysis, with its heavy reli-
ance on market shares and market concentration, has given rise to
presumptive rules of illegality.242 However, as the Commission il-
lustrated in the Echlin Manufacturing24 3 decision and a number of
courts in other decisions, 2 " presumptive illegality, even when man-
dated by the "current" merger guidelines, is also losing recognition.
The efficiencies doctrine will contribute to the continuing de-
cline of per se illegality in antitrust law in general and in merger
analysis in particular. Although the imprecision of the current
standards that govern application of the doctrine, and the inherent
difficulty in balancing productive and allocative efficiencies, may
limit the doctrine's effectiveness, the antitrust agencies and the
courts will attach greater significance to demonstrable efficiencies.
It is difficult to say what the equilibrium point will be between effi-
ciencies considerations and quantitative factors in merger analysis.
Following the lead that the Commission took in its Echlin Manu-
facturing2 4 decision for entry barriers, a rule of per se legality upon
a showing of tenable efficiencies is certainly not out of the question.
However, it is certain that the efficiencies doctrine is just now begin-
ning to come into its own in merger analysis.
239. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
240. The majority asserted that "[p]er se condemnation ... is only appropriate if the
existence of forcing [the sale of a tied item] is probable." Id. at 15.
241. Id. at 25 (hospital did not force services upon unwilling patients, thus there was no
basis for applying a per se rule).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963).
Notwithstanding the Court's later efforts in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974), to eliminate this rule of presumptive illegality, some courts have substan-
tially narrowed the General Dynamics holding so that presumptive illegality is still the rule.
See, e.g., Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 761 F.2d at 580-81. See also supra note 1.
243. 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,268 (F.T.C. June 28, 1985). See supra note 2.
244. See cases cited supra note 2.
245. Commissioner Bailey, dissenting in Echlin, claimed that the Commission's emphasis
of entry barriers above quantitative analysis in that case "leads to a rule of per se legality for
many mergers." See Echlin, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,268.
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